THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS
SCHOOL OF LAW
Law and Economics Working Paper No. 018
February 2004

Credit Card Policy in a Globalized World
Ronald J. Mann
The University of Texas School of Law

This paper can be downloaded without charge from the
Social Science Research Network Electronic Paper Collection:
http://ssrn.com/abstract=509063
An index to the working papers in
The University of Texas School of Law Working Paper Series
is located at: http://www.utexas.edu/law/

February 16, 2004 Draft

CREDIT CARD POLICY IN A GLOBALIZED WORLD
Ronald J. Mann

*

TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. Introduction....................................................................................................................1
II. Failure and Success........................................................................................................3
A. The Basic Story ........................................................................................................6
1. The Age of the Payment Card ............................................................................6
2. The Age of Revolving Credit ..............................................................................8
3. The Age of the Debit Card ...............................................................................14
B. Marginal Explanations ..........................................................................................19
1. Legal Protections for Card Users....................................................................19
2. Cultural Norms of Usage .................................................................................21
(a) Frugality .....................................................................................................22
(b) Fear of Crime .............................................................................................25
3. Miscellaneous Institutional Precursors ...........................................................27
III. Credit Cards and Prodigality........................................................................................29
A. The Problem of Prodigality ...................................................................................29
B. The Relation Between Credit Card Debt and Consumer Bankruptcy ...................34
C. Looking Forward: Credit Card Use and Bankruptcy Law....................................37
IV. Policy Responses .........................................................................................................40
A. Excluding Banks from the Market..........................................................................42
B. Regulating Prices...................................................................................................43
1. The Problem.....................................................................................................43
2. Responses.........................................................................................................45
(a) Merchant Price Discrimination...................................................................46

*

William Stamps Farish Professor in Law, University of Texas School of Law. This
paper was prepared for the 2003 John C. Akard Distinguished Lecture at the University of Texas
School of Law. I thank Allison Mann for tireless inspiration, aid, and counsel, Bill Powers for
unstinting support, Peggy Brundage for administrative assistance of various kinds, Joe DeKunder,
Mark Gergen and Jay Westbrook for comments, and Dan Powers and Tracey Kyckelhahn for
statistical assistance. For assistance in collecting data, I am grateful to the National Bank of
Belgium, the Department of Finance of Canada, the Bank of France and Cartes Bancaires, the
Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies at the Bank of Japan, and the Bank of England. I
also thank Morgan Stanley and Euromonitor for the use of proprietary data they kindly have
provided to me. I owe special thanks to the Marlow Preston Fellowship for funding my work on
this paper.

ii

Credit Card Policy

February 16, 2004 Draft

(b) Interchange Rates .......................................................................................48
(c) Affinity Programs.......................................................................................52
C. Regulating Information..........................................................................................55
1. Special Rules for Minors..................................................................................56
2. Contemporaneous Disclosures ........................................................................57
V. Conclusion ...................................................................................................................60
Bibliography ........................................................................................................................ I
Data Appendix ................................................................................................................VIII
Statistical Appendix ......................................................................................................... XII
A. The Relative Significance of Economic Development and Globalization ........... XII
B. Crime and Credit Card Spending ...................................................................... XIV
C. Credit Card Debt and Savings........................................................................... XVI
D. Credit Card Debt, Consumer Credit, and Bankruptcy ..................................... XVII
E. Credit Card Spending and Consumer Bankruptcy Discharges ......................... XIX

ii

iii

Credit Card Policy

February 16, 2004 Draft

Illustrations
Figure One – Card Transactions Per Capita ........................................................................4
Figure Two – Credit Card Transactions/Card Transactions ................................................4
Figure Three – Credit Card Debt/Credit Card Volume .......................................................5
Figure Four – Credit Card Spending/GDP (Japan)............................................................11
Figure Five – Credit Card Spending/GDP (EU) ................................................................12
Figure Six – Credit Card Spending/GDP (South Korea) ...................................................13
Figure Seven – Credit Card Debt/GDP (South Korea)......................................................14
Figure Eight – Debit Card Transactions/Total Card Transactions.....................................15
Figure Nine – Card Transactions/Capita (Commonwealth) ..............................................16
Figure Ten – Credit Card Debt/Card Value.......................................................................16
Figure Eleven – Transaction Shares of Noncash Consumer Payment Systems (U.S.)......18
Figure Twelve – Credit Card Fraud ...................................................................................28
Figure Thirteen – Discharge and C/C Spending ................................................................39
Figure Fourteen – Pricing Interfaces..................................................................................45
Table One: Consumer Credit/GDP ....................................................................................23

iii

CREDIT CARD POLICY IN A GLOBALIZED WORLD
I. INTRODUCTION1
Since they first appeared in the middle of the last century, card-based payment
systems – credit cards, debit cards, charge cards, etc. – have transformed the practice of
retail payment. Their growth throughout the developed world has raised widespread
policy concerns. For example, many in this country argue that widespread use of credit
cards can contribute to excess consumption, and ultimately to an undue incidence of
financial distress.2 Regulators in other countries have not focused on that problem, but
instead have focused on features of retail pricing to consumers. Specifically, they have
been concerned that a system in which consumers pay the same price whether they use
cash or a credit card forces consumers that do not use cards to subsidize those who do,
producing an increase in retail prices for all.3
In many respects, of course, sharply different patterns of usage in various
countries suggest that each country’s payment card is a creature of its local environment.
On the other hand, the breadth of a growth trend that has altered customary practices in
so many countries suggests that much can be learned from a careful analysis of the
various cultural, legal, and institutional factors that affect their use can contribute to a
nuanced understanding of how they affect economic activity. This paper takes up the
challenge of that more optimistic perspective. I organize the discussion around three
broad inquiries: the causes of failure and success of payment cards, the effects of
payment cards when they succeed, and potential policy responses to those effects.
On the first point, I take advantage of a substantial body of existing historical
work and public data.4 I also rely on a great deal of proprietary data,5 information I
collected during substantial stays in Japan (at the Bank of Japan’s Institute for Monetary
and Economic Studies)6 and in Great Britain (with assistance from the Bank of

1

Although I have read an early draft of Oren Bar-Gill, Seduction by Plastic, I do not refer
to that manuscript in the references to this paper because that manuscript has not yet widely been
circulated.
2

Ellis 1998; Lawless 2002; Stavins 2000; Warren 1998.

3

Subpart IV(B) discusses regulatory initiatives that present that concern in Australia, the
European Union, and the United Kingdom.
4

Much of the data for other countries is publicly available from the Bank for
International Settlements, Web sites for central banks, and publications of local industry trade
groups (particularly APACS in the United Kingdom). The Data Appendix details the sources of
my statistics on each of the countries discussed in the paper.
5

Most of the information about the United States, for example, is gleaned from
proprietary sources such as The Nilson Report and Carddata.
6

Mann 2002 presents details from the study of Japan.
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England),7 and private data provided to me by central banks in a number of other
countries.8 That part of the paper does two things. First, it provides an overview of
variations in the usage of payment cards in various countries, disentangling the related
histories of credit cards, charge cards, and debit cards. Second, it provides a general
explanation of the factors that are (and are not) relevant to the success and failure of
credit cards. Many factors are important in explaining particular parts of the story, some
legal, some cultural, and some that are general features of the institutional background.
The basic theme is that the most important single factor in the rise of the credit card is the
deployment of information technology capable of sophisticated analysis of information
about the creditworthiness of particular cardholders. Much of the timing and variation of
growth in credit cards can be traced to the availability of that technology. On the other
hand, the pattern of usage and the data I have collected suggests a much less general role
for other commonly asserted explanations. The most prominent are cultural aversions to
borrowing, that might constrain credit card use in particular, and legal protections for
card users or fear of crime, both of which might foster card use generally.
The second part of the paper turns from questions about what people do and why
they do it to consider the effects of credit card use. I present analysis of two important
questions. First, I present a regression of time-series data from four countries (Australia,
Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States) to analyze the relation between
credit card use, on the one hand, and bankruptcy on the other. The purpose of that
analysis is to examine whether there is something special about borrowing with credit
cards that is more likely to result in prodigal spending than other types of borrowing.
The data generally support the notion that credit card debt is uniquely likely to contribute
to a higher rate of financial distress. Specifically, controlling for the general level of
consumer debt, an increase in credit card debt is related to a cognizable rise in consumer
bankruptcy filings. To put the point simply, bankruptcies will rise substantially after an
increase in credit card debt, even if the overall level of consumer borrowing remains
unchanged.
I then consider the possibility that credit card spending’s effect on a nation’s
economy is so pervasive that it can affect the legal system that governs creditor’s rights.
Specifically, I present data showing a high correlation between credit card spending, on
the one hand, and a more lenient bankruptcy discharge on the other. The data suggest
that countries in which heavy credit card spending develops are led to alter their
bankruptcy systems so as to provide a relatively lenient discharge to consumers.
The final part of the paper considers a variety of policy responses to card use.
The problem is a difficult one because of the important beneficial features of card use –
as an inexpensive both for making payments and for obtaining unsecured credit. The best
7

The study of Great Britain was accomplished in a 2003 visit to London that included
interviews with a variety of regulatory bodies and industry executives. It is not yet reflected in a
separate paper.
8

I am grateful for assistance provided to me by central banks in Belgium, Canada,
France, Italy, Japan, and the United Kingdom.

2
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policy responses will be those that are most likely to stem the prodigal behavior that
causes the adverse effects discussed in Part III and least likely to prohibit or render
impractical the value-increasing borrowing transactions that make credit cards valuable to
so many businesses and consumers. After a cautionary tale based on Japan’s experience
about the perils of blunt exclusion of banks from the credit-card market, I consider two
classes of proposals: regulation of the various prices charged at the various stages of a
credit card transaction, and regulation of information provided to potential users. On the
first point, I criticize the regulation of interchange fees currently underway in several
other countries, preferring instead initiatives that would directly validate credit-card
surcharges by merchants. More ambitiously (and tentatively), I also suggest a ban on
affinity programs (cash-back and airline-miles programs being the most obvious),
because they give cardholders an unduly large incentive to use credit cards.
On the second point, I recommend a flat ban on marketing to minors and college
students, extending a similar ban that already exists in UK law. Finally, and most
importantly, I recommend a general reorganization of the disclosure regime in the Truth
in Lending Act. The current disclosure system focuses on disclosures at the time of the
application or the time the cardholder reads the monthly bill. The analysis in Part III,
however, suggests that the point of the problem is the point at which cardholders borrow.
Accordingly, I recommend regulations requiring issuers to disclose at the point of sale
the balance, available credit, and any applicable overlimit fees. As I explain, I think
those particular reforms best balance the goal of limiting prodigal behavior against the
possibility of imposing prohibitory or impractical constraints on the valuable aspects of
card transactions.

II. FAILURE AND SUCCESS
The rapid rise of payment cards has been widespread, but it has been far from
uniform. The stark variation in three metrics of their impact is illustrative. The first
metric is retail card usage, excluding cash withdrawals at ATMs. Figure One illustrates a
major increase in card usage over the last decade, but the rates of usage vary widely, from
less than 20 transactions per person per year in Japan and Italy to more than 100
transactions per person in Canada and the United States.

3
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Figure One
Card Transactions Per Capita
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Another important question is the type of card that cardholders use. As Figure
Two shows, the relative share of credit and debit card usage ranges from countries like
Japan and the United States, where credit cards are used much more frequently than debit
cards, to countries like Belgium and the Netherlands, where credit cards are rarely used.

Figure Two: Credit Card Trans./
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The third metric is the most important for the purposes of this paper, the share of
borrowing, which I measure by the ratio of credit card debt to credit card volume.9 As
Figure Three shows, the amount of borrowing ranges from about 20% in New Zealand
and South Korea to more than 50% in the United States.

Figure Three: Credit Card Debt/
Credit Card Volume
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The wide variations suggest that the first step in any major inquiry into the policy
significance of the payment-card phenomenon is to consider why the patterns of usage
are so different in different countries. The myriad reasons that might affect the use of
credit and debit cards in any particular country make any inquiry complex. Among other
things, the specific level of usage in any particular country is likely to be influenced at
least in part by the interplay among legal rules that foster or retard card usage, cultural
norms that support or inhibit the practice of using cards, and more general institutional
factors that facilitate or block the development of a robust card market.
I respond to that maze of considerations in two steps. The first section of this part
sets out a general picture of the rise of payment cards, delineating what seem to me the
principal factors that have driven the success and failure of credit cards and debit cards in
9

Media often assess this concern by reporting the share of cardholders that “consistently”
pay off their bills each month. As of the end of 2002, that metric was at 39.10 for bank-issued
credit cards in the United States. It rose steadily from 28.60 in 1990 to 44.4 in 2000, but has
fallen each of the last two years. See CardData, Bank Credit Card Convenience Usage – Current,
available at http://www.cardweb.com/carddata/charts/convenience_usage.amp (last visited Nov.
24, 2003) (subscription required). Aside from the difficulty of knowing precisely what that
means, it is not possible to obtain that statistic for any country other than the United States. The
metric reported in the text is one that I can calculate readily for other countries.

5
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the major markets. The basic theme of that part is that the single most important factor
distinguishing between the success of credit cards and the failure of credit cards has been
the availability of sophisticated systems for assessing the creditworthiness of potential
cardholders. As those systems have developed, card-based lending has become more
successful. Where those systems are not available, card-based lending has been less
successful.
The second section then considers a variety of explanations to which I assign
more marginal importance. The most prominent subjects of that section are legal rules
protecting cardholders, cultural norms that respond to the fear of crime or an aversion to
borrowing, and miscellaneous institutional factors such as the relative size of merchants,
telecommunication costs, and the size of the national economy. Although most of those
factors probably have some explanatory value in some countries, I find them less useful
in explaining the overall global pattern.

A. The Basic Story
The best way to understand the most salient variations in card usage is to
understand the path by which payment cards have developed. That development has had
three major stages. The first stage was the successful deployment of payment cards
without the significant extension of credit. The second was the successful development
by financial institutions of the revolving credit product that historically has been the
principal basis of the card’s profitability. Networks and issuers have deployed the profits
from that product to provide the incentives that have led merchants and consumers to use
the credit card with increasing frequency. Finally, in the third stage, the availability of
POS PIN technology has made a sophisticated debit card product feasible. The
development of that technology has resulted in the rapid growth of that product. The
growth of the debit card, in turn, is substantially lessening the relevance of credit to the
cards market. The policy implications of that trend, and of institutional arrangements that
might slow that trend, are central to the discussion of Parts II and III.
Because much of the history (particularly the early history in the United States)
has been discussed in detail in general histories of the credit card,10 there is no reason for
me to recount it in detail. Accordingly, my discussion focuses on the features that have
not been central in prior treatments, the particular institutional factors that made
development initially feasible in the United States, and the reasons why differing
institutional environments in other countries generally foreclosed the path followed in the
United States.
1. The Age of the Payment Card
When the payment card first came into significant use in the 1950’s in the United
States, it served a payment function quite different from the function it serves now. The

10

Evans & Schmalensee 1999; Manning 2000; Ritzer 1995
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dominant product was the Diners Club card, what we would now call a travel and
entertainment card or a charge card.11 Its primary use was for the traveler purchasing
food and accommodations from distant merchants. Because of the difficulty of making
any informed assessment of the likelihood that the traveler’s bank would honor a check,
those merchants justifiably would be reluctant to accept a non-local check from the
traveler. The problems of creditworthiness were only aggravated by the long clearance
times prevalent for non-local checks before the Expedited Funds Availability Act.12
As a response to that problem, the payment card was a brilliant invention. Diners
Club (and those that followed in its steps) wanted to issue the cards because it could
profit from the fees it charged to merchants for guaranteeing payment by cardholders.
Merchants were willing to accept the cards because the costs that they would pay in
interchange would not exceed substantially the costs that they faced from the acceptance
of checks. Those costs included not only delay in payment, but also losses from
nonpayment and the costs (including the indignity and hassle) of credit assessment of
their customers. Those costs also included, of course, the costs of business turned away
when the merchant refused to accept a check and no other payment system was available.
Finally, customers wanted to use the cards because it made the process of obtaining
accommodations and other services in remote locations much simpler. Because the
payment card did not involve a protracted extension of credit, and because the product
had relatively little competition, Diners Club was able to make a profit off the product
even without the technological advances on which the broader uses of payment cards in
more recent years have depended.13
For comparative purposes, two aspects of the institutional environment in which
that product competed bear mention. The first is the simple fact that the United States is
a relatively large country and that during the 1950’s – with the rise of the interstate
highway system and the postwar economic boom – there was a significant mass of
business travelers at distances remote from their homes. The second factor relates to the
United States banking market. One of the reasons that non-local checks were so
expensive and time-consuming for merchants to collect is the fractionated nature of that
market. For good reasons or bad, the United States banking industry – by comparison to
the banking industries of other countries – has been quite unconcentrated. In 1952, for
example, when the credit card was invented, there were 14,000 commercial banks in the
United States.14 That is to some degree generally related to a persistent populist
11

Simmons 1995.

12

Until Congress’s 1987 enactment of the Expedited Funds Availability Act, 12 U.S.C.
§§ 4001-4010, “the check-clearing process too often lagged, taking days or even weeks to
complete.” Bank One Chicago, N.A. v. Midwest Bank & Trust Co., 516 U.S. 264, 266 (1996).
For a brief discussion of that statute, see Mann 2003.
13

Simmons 1995 is the best source for that period.

14

JOINT COMMITTEE ON CHECK COLLECTION SYSTEM, STUDY OF CHECK COLLECTION
SYSTEM (1954) (presented to American Bankers Association, Association of Reserve City
Bankers, and Conference of Presidents of the Federal Reserve Banks).
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suspicion of large financial enterprises.15 It also probably is specifically related to the
WWI-era decision of the Federal Reserve to support the collection of checks at par,
which advantaged small banks over the large.16 In this context, the deep fractionation of
the banking market means that a relatively large portion of checks accepted by the types
of merchants that deal with out-of-town business travelers would be drawn on banks that
did not have a presence in the area in which the check was presented.
Those factors are important in understanding the relatively early rise of payment
cards in the United States, because they help to explain why payment cards did not arise
to any significant degree in any other country until much later. In few other countries
would a business traveler have considered traveling to a remote destination and using
anything other than cash as a payment system. And to the extent that they would, a
concentrated banking system predictably would lead – as in England – to procedures by
which checks readily could be accepted for such transactions throughout the country.
Thus, in England a check-guarantee card developed early on, usable throughout
the country. The check-guarantee card solved the same problem as the Diners Club card
in this country, but did not lead to the early development of a payment-card network.17
The key to that product was the concentrated banking system. England has only a small
number of significant banks (less than five at all relevant times), all of whom have some
market presence throughout the country. Thus, a business traveler in a remote part of the
country presenting a check for payment, backed by a check guarantee card, had the
benefit of a local bank assuring payment. Business travelers in the United States have not
had that kind of support for the acceptance of their checks.

2. The Age of Revolving Credit
Recognizing the potential for profiting from the issuance of payment cards, a
significant number of banks (led most prominently by Bank of America) began to offer
similar products in the 1960’s. The banks, however, soon transformed the cards into
something entirely new: a general-purpose payment card that could be used to access a
substantial line of revolving credit. As others have recounted, it was difficult in the early
days to profit from this product.18 I have argued before that banks introduced revolving
credit cards as a loss leader, with the hope that the market eventually would grow large
enough to make the product profitable, as in fact has happened.19 Because applicable
regulations at the time prevented banks from competing by offering a higher price
15

Roe 1994.

16

Gilbert 2000.

17

The details of the rise of the check-guarantee card are based on interviews with UK
regulators and industry executives.
18

Manning 2000.

19

Mann 2002; Credit Cards Pioneer Dies, CARDS INTERNATIONAL, 16 Dec. 2003, at 6
(obituary for Joseph Williams, who fashioned that campaign for Bank of America and was fired
because of the losses the bank sustained in its early credit card operations).
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(interest rate) for deposits, providing this product as a form of lagniappe was a natural
way to compete for customers.20
The depositary relations banks had with their customers gave banks an advantage
in assessing the creditworthiness of potential cardholders. In the absence of the
information or technology for any more sophisticated assessment of creditworthiness than
the information readily available from the depositary relationship, non-bank entities (such
as Diners Club and American Express) were not able to compete in that market.21
Similarly, in countries where banks were not permitted to issue cards (Japan being the
obvious example), the arrival of the credit card market was delayed by decades.22
During the next three decades (from about 1965 to 1995), the revolving credit
product became the dominant card product in North America and began to spread rapidly
into many countries elsewhere. Two related institutional factors were central both to the
success of the product in the United States and to the spread of the product to other
countries. The first was the rise of national credit sharing bureaus, which gave lenders
much more extensive information about potential cardholders – not only negative
information about defaults and arrearages, but also positive information that helped
lenders to make sophisticated determinations about the likely performance of potential
cardholders.23 Those bureaus came into being in the 1950’s, shortly before credit cards
first appeared in the American market.24
Related to that development was the advent of computerized information
processing – software products that allowed lenders to analyze credit information in
increasingly sophisticated ways, culminating in the credit scoring products that dominate
modern consumer credit underwriting. The rise of sophisticated information processing
has altered the credit card market fundamentally. For one thing, it has made underwriting
vastly more accurate. One recent Federal-Reserve researcher, for example, estimated that
automated credit assessment through credit scoring reduced bank loan losses on
consumer credit by $5 billion per year.25
More broadly, however, it has completely altered the competitive landscape of the
issuing process. In a system where a depositary bank is the only entity that profitably can
issue a credit card, there is little competition on the terms on which the card is to be
issued: the cardholder will use the card if the terms on which his bank offers the card

20

Mann 2002.

21

Simmons 1995; Friedman & Meehan 1992.

22

Mann 2002.

23

Hunt 2002.

24

Pagano & Jappelli 1993 (discussing the rise of credit bureaus without making any link
to credit cards).
25

Hunt 2002. That result is consistent with typical models of screening costs in the
consumer credit industry, such as Khalil & Parigi 2001.
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make it valuable for him to use the card. However, where a bank’s ability to offer
profitable card products depends on its information technology more than its depositary
relationships, any bank can compete for the customer’s business. Thus, we see in the
United States the rise of monoline banks – banks without substantial depositary
businesses that focus primarily on the credit card market. The competition that they
bring to the card market is so pervasive that by the late 1990’s more than 80% of active
credit card accounts in the United States were with banks that do not have a depositary
relationship with the customer.26
That understanding of the American market has profound implications for the rise
of credit card markets in other countries, because many other countries have impediments
that prevent their market from developing along that path. As mentioned above, Japan
for decades prevented banks from being involved with revolving credit card products,
which helped to stifle any substantial credit card market until the early 1990’s when those
restrictions began to be repealed. Japan is marked even to this day by a stunted revolving
credit market. In Japan, every card is tied to a specific deposit account. When you
purchase with a credit card, the system operates on the assumption that you will pay for
the first transaction in the first billing cycle (“ikkai barai”). If you do not change that
assumption, payment for your purchases will be debited from your account automatically
once a month, in much the same way that we can arrange to have recurring payments
taken automatically from our accounts. If you do not want to have payment for the
purchase taken from your account in that way, you have to orally request a different
payment plan, essentially advising the retail clerk and any customers who happen to be
nearby that you do not plan to pay off your credit card bill the next month.27 It is not
surprising that the public assertion of borrowing required to take advantage of Japanese
revolving credit has not been common.28

26

Evans & Schmalensee 1999. I have never used a credit card issued by a bank at which
I had a deposit account.
27

Another debilitating feature of Japanese revolving credit is that you must select from a
menu of repayment schedules while at the counter. Typically, you could agree to pay for the
transaction in 2, 3, 4, 5, or 10 months, or from your next annual bonus. Mann 2002. Although
that menu is a long one, it does not provide the flexibility American cardholders have, to pay each
month for whatever share of the transaction appears best at the time.
28

Mann 2002.
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Figure Four: Credit-Card
Spending/GDP (Japan)
14
12
10
Japan
UK
US

8
6
4
2

20
02

20
00

19
98

19
96

19
94

19
92

19
90

0

A more common obstacle relates to the information on which banks rely for
accurate underwriting. The bank’s use of that information is profoundly offensive to the
privacy customs in most of the developed world – particularly mainland Europe. Thus,
although the Fair Credit Reporting Act might be a high point in the largely ineffectual
protections American law provides for personal data, that statute provides much less
protection than the European Data Privacy Directive, to which all countries in the
European Union are obligated to conform.29 Under that Directive, the storage and
transmission of identifiable credit information to third parties without the specific
knowledge and consent of the customer would be plainly illegal.30 Hence, in countries
adhering to such a regime, it is not possible for a lender to obtain the kind of broadranging positive and negative information on which American-style credit scoring
depends.31 If the absence of such information would have the negative effects on the
profitability of the American industry that observers suggest,32 it is easy to see how great
an obstacle the general absence of such information poses to the expansion of the credit
card in those countries. Empirical work by European academics finds a strong causal
connection: the inability of lenders to obtain both positive and negative information about

29

Mann & Winn 2002.

30

Data Protection Directive arts. 7, 15. Those provisions are implemented into law in the
UK in the Data Protection Act, §§ 4 (and Schedule 1), 11.
31

Jentzsch 2001.

32

Hunt 2002.
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borrowers appears to correlate with smaller consumer lending markets.33 Thus, except
for the United Kingdom (which has developed a complex program to avoid this
problem),34 credit-card spending is quite low in the European Union.

Figure Five: Credit Card
Spending/GDP (EU)
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The issue has come to the fore in the EU in the last year, as proposed revisions to
the European Consumer Credit Directive would make it all but impossible for monoline
issuers to operate in Europe.35 Among other things, that directive would require
personalized counseling about the pros and cons of various lending products that is
antithetical to the lean staffing traditional for a successful monoline bank.36 As discussed

33

Jappelli & Pagano 2000; Jappelli & Pagano 2000a; Jentzsch & Riestra 2003; Padilla &
Pagano 1999.
34

The ability of the UK to develop a substantial credit card market in the last few years
rests on the UK’s willingness to tolerate a complicated system that allows credit card issuers to
work around the constraints of the Directive. Under that system, credit bureaus permit issuers to
evaluate files of individuals stripped of identifying information. After the issuers determine
which files reflect credit histories suitable for their marketing, the issuers can send solicitations to
the individuals reflected in those files. Interview with Experian’s Bureau in the UK.
35

Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the
Harmonization of the Law, Regulations and Administrative Provisions of the Member States
Concerning Credit for Consumers, COM (2002) 443 (Sept. 11, 2002).
36

Among other things, Article 6.3 of the proposed Directive would require lenders to
provide advice to customers about the proper product for the customer’s particular use. That
requirement would be burdensome for credit cards generally because of the difficulty of
predicting at the time of the application how the card ultimately will be used. It would be
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above, regulations that make it difficult for monoline issuers to operate are likely to have
the inevitable effect of stifling innovation by limiting competition so that for most
cardholders the only plausible issuer is the bank at which the cardholder maintains the
primary deposit account. That is particularly important in the UK, where the advent of
American monoline issuers in the late 1990’s seems to be connected with the recent
growth of credit card debt illustrated in Figure Three.37
To illustrate the same point in a more somber way, consider the cautionary tale of
South Korea. Issuers in that country recently have engaged in heavy marketing and
issuance of revolving credit cards, despite the absence of the kind of credit-assessment
system customary in the United States. At first, those efforts were successful, as shown
by the rapid increase in credit card spending that Figure Six displays.

Figure Six: Credit Card
Spending/GDP (South Korea)
50
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
19
90
19
92
19
94
19
96
19
98
20
00
20
02

Aus.
Japan
US
S Korea

Those transactions also, however, led to an unnatural increase in the volume of
credit card lending. The natural consequence of lending without appropriate information,
unfortunately, is an unacceptable rate of defaults. In the case of South Korea, it led in
2003 to delinquencies by ten million cardholders (in a country with a population of less
than 50 million). Those delinquencies eventually required a $4 billion government

particularly difficult for monoline issuers that do not ordinarily maintain staff to engage in
personalized discussions with each customer. For a general discussion from the perspective of
the industry, see APACS, The Proposed Consumer Credit Directive (Com (2002) 443) & Its
Potential Consequences for the UK Credit Card Market (Apr. 23, 2003).
37
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bailout of the major credit card issuers. Only after the crisis have issuers had access to
positive (“white”) data as a tool to assess the creditworthiness of potential cardholders.

Figure Seven: Credit Card
Debt/GDP (South Korea)
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3. The Age of the Debit Card
Recognizing that it is difficult to speak with perspective about events that are so
recent, the most prominent trend of the last ten years has been the rapid rise of the debit
card, which threatens to eclipse the credit card in its dominance of the industry. As
Figure Eight illustrates, the share of debit cards in all card transactions has risen
significantly since the early 1990’s in countries as different as the United States, Italy,
Sweden, and China.
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Figure Eight: Debit Card
Transactions/Card Transactions
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In some countries, that increase reflects the first major influx of card use. For
example, in the UK, Australia, and Canada card transactions per capita rose from about
30 in the early 1990’s to much larger numbers by the end of the decade (about 80 for the
UK and Australia, and 120 for Canada). Figure Nine. Except for the case of Australia
(which I discuss below), debit cards drove most of that growth. In countries in which the
revolving credit model described above never succeeded, technological advances offered
a separate route to a burgeoning card industry, leapfrogging the revolving credit stage.
Here, the specific infrastructure development was the continuing decline in the cost of
POS terminals, which has made it cost-effective in many countries for all but the smallest
merchants to accept debit cards at the POS. The business case for the card in that
situation – typified by England – was as a replacement for the check. Essentially, the
debit card served as a convenient vehicle for fostering a switch from expensive paperbased transactions to cheaper electronic transactions.38
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Figure Nine: Card Transactions Per
Capita (Commonwealth)
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Canada is the most notable example of that trend: card transactions in Canada
have grown even more rapidly than in the United States, so that since 1998 there actually
have been more card transactions per capita in Canada than in the United States. As a
latecomer to those transactions, though, Canada has maintained a persistently low rate of
borrowing in its credit card transactions. Thus, the overall ratio of card debt to card value
is now about 20%, roughly half the rate in the United States. Figure Ten

Figure Ten: Credit Card Debt/
Card Value
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Similarly in the UK, the ready technological availability of the debit card in the
late 1990’s came shortly after the wide deployment of the revolving credit card in the
early 1990’s. As a result, British credit card debt as a share of card transactions began to
fall shortly after its appearance, with a result similar to Canada’s: a ratio of card debt to
card value of about 20% at the turn of the millennium.
Australia offers a slightly different example, because a disproportionately large
share of its growth has come from credit card transactions, rather than debit card
transactions. As shown in Figure Eight, Australia is perhaps the only country in the
world in which the relative share of credit card transactions grew during the 1990’s.
Nevertheless, even in Australia, debit card transactions have grown rapidly, and the rate
of borrowing on credit cards has fallen steadily, so that the absolute share of debt as a
portion of total card value has fallen to about the same level in Australia as in the UK and
Canada.
The rise in use of the debit card is somewhat harder to understand in the United
States. In the United States, the debit card in many ways is inferior from the perspective
of a hypothetical rational consumer. For one thing, the consumer must pay for the
purchase immediately, without the flexibility and float that the revolving credit card
provides. For another, the consumer is much less likely to receive affinity benefits. The
marketing strategies of credit card issuers suggest that those benefits attract a significant
number of consumers. Last, as discussed below, the consumer receives fewer legal
protections for problems with debit transactions than it does for credit card transactions.39
Still, it is easy to see strong reasons for the rise in use of the card. First, even in
the United States, a significant part of the population does not have credit cards.
Estimates vary, but about 25% of the adult population does not have a credit card.40 For
those individuals, debit cards are the only available payment card.
Another explanation looks more broadly at the payment systems market. From
that perspective, the appropriate comparison is not between the credit card and the debit
card, but between the debit card and the check. In function, the debit card is a close
substitute for the check, allowing a purchaser to pay for goods by authorizing his bank to
disburse funds from a deposit account directly to the merchant. The principal difference
is that the customer makes the authorization electronically (with the card) rather than by
paper (with a check). It is plausible to view the growth of debit cards in the United States
not as a shift from credit cards, but rather as the growth of a new cards market by
purchasers who are abandoning checks in favor of debit cards. That explanation is
supported by statistics on retail use of payment systems. As Figure 11 shows, that data
indicate that the use of credit cards has remained more or less constant at 16-18% of

39

That is even more likely to be true outside the United States, where protections for
debit cards are relatively uncommon.
40

Demos
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transactions since 1994. The growth of debit cards during that same period from about
1% to 11% has closely matched a fall of checks from 36% to 23%.41

Figure 11: Transactions Shares of
Noncash Consumer Payment
Systems (U.S.)
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A more general explanation rests on standard types of quasi-rational behavior by
cardholders. Most obviously, some cardholders might prefer to use a debit card because
it provides a pre-commitment against spending in excess of a present income stream.42
Of course, a rational consumer could make the same purchases with a credit card and
gain the additional financial benefits that come with that product in the United States
market. Still, anecdotal evidence – primarily frequent conversations with debit card users
among my students – suggests that a desire to avoid the temptation of borrowing is
behind a significant part of the rise of the debit card in the United States. That story
resonates strongly with the story about “budgetism” that Lendol Calder famously uses to
explain the attractiveness of consumer credit in the first instance in this country.43
The discussion above helps to explain the unusual failure of the debit card in
Japan. Introduced with great fanfare in the spring of 2000, the product has not made any
significant progress in the market: the most recent statistics indicate far less than one
transaction per capita per year. Because Japan is a country in which cards are not used
for borrowing, the failure of the debit card at first puzzled me. Eventually I concluded
that it had failed for two reasons. First, unlike the UK and the Commonwealth countries

41

Nilson Report 799.
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Thaler 1991.
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Calder 1999.
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discussed above, there is no market impetus to promote debit cards to save the costs of
checks; Japanese consumers do not use checks.44 Nor is there any need to use the
product to precommit against borrowing.45 Japan’s odd credit card already had filled the
market niche for the debit card. The ikkai barai product discussed above provides
automatic payment from the account for all but the most inveterate of consumer
borrowers. That arrangement gives the precommitted cardholder enough support to
refrain from borrowing. Thus, if the market niche for the debit card rests on a fear of
borrowing coupled with a desire to precommit to avoid excessive borrowing, the existing
Japanese products already fill the niche adequately. From that perspective, the Japanese
debit card has failed because its marketers have failed to produce a business case that can
persuade cardholders to switch to the card.

B. Marginal Explanations
1. Legal Protections for Users
In the numerous conversations I have had during recent years about precisely why
credit and debit cards are so much more popular in some countries than they are in others,
one of the most common suggestions is that consumers use those cards because of the
legislative protections that governments give to the transactions. In the United States, for
example, the Truth in Lending Act and the Electronic Funds Transfer Act provide
protection for cardholders against unauthorized transactions on credit or debit cards.46
The Truth in Lending Act goes even further for credit cards, also providing, among other
things, a right to withhold payment that allows the cardholder, in appropriate
circumstances, to present against the card issuer any defense that the cardholder had
against the merchant from which the cardholder purchased the goods or services in
question.47 Thus, for example, if a cardholder purchases a book from an online
bookseller and the book never arrives, the cardholder is not obligated to pay the credit
card bill associated with that transaction; it is up to the issuer to recover from the
bookseller.48
Those protections are not unique to the United States. England49 and Canada50
have similar though somewhat narrower protections for credit cards. Japan has a
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Mann 2002.
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I discuss the second explanation at length in Mann 2002.
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TILA § 133; EFTA § 909.
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TILA § 170.
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Mann 2003.
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Section 75 of the Consumer Credit Act imposes liability on the issuer for defects in
goods and services purchased with a credit card (parallel to TILA § 170 in the United States.
Sections 83 and 84 limit the issuer’s ability to charge the customer for unauthorized transactions
(parallel to TILA § 133). Stephenson 1993.
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None of those countries,

At first glance, the argument seems powerful, primarily because the United States
has both one of the most generous consumer-protection statutes for credit cards and also
one of the highest rates of credit card use in the world. A closer examination of the
available evidence, however, makes it hard to put much weight on the consumer
protection statutes as the cause of card use.
The first point is not an empirical one, but rather an argument from common
understandings of the behavior of consumers. The most obvious difficulty with the
argument that consumer-protection statutes are an important factor in the success of cardbased payment systems is that the statutes can affect the behavior of consumers in a
substantial way only if a complicated series of unlikely events come true. First, the
statutes can motivate consumer behavior only if consumers are sufficiently familiar with
them to understand the protections they afford. That seems most unlikely. Is it plausible,
for example, that the average American consumer understands the difference in legal
protections that arises from the use of a debit card rather than a credit card?53
Second, even if consumers in fact do understand the protections that the statutes
afford, those protections can motivate consumers only if consumers accurately weigh the
risks against which those statutes protect them when they select a payment system.
Common behavioral biases that limit rational consideration of uncommon unfortunate
events suggest that for many consumers those problems will not be given due weight.54
Third, even if consumers do understand the statutes and do give due rational
weight to them, in many cases the protections would not affect their use of the card.
Protections against unauthorized transactions, for example, should not be particularly
useful in motivating card use if the use is one that is not likely to affect result in
unauthorized transactions. For example, why would protections against unauthorized

50

Canada limits liability for $50 for unauthorized transactions that occur before
notification of the creditor, but does not protect telephone-order or Internet transactions at all.
Cost of Borrowing Regulations § 12; Geva 2003.
51

Japan has a limited protection against unauthorized transactions (parallel to TILA §
133) in Article 30 of the Installment Sales Law [Kappu hanbaihō], Law No. 159 of 1961. That
law, however, only applies to kappu transactions; it excludes the overwhelming majority of
transactions that are accomplished through ikkai barai. Mann 2002.
52

Voluntary codes among banks in Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom provides
protection for unauthorized debit card transactions where the cardholder is not negligent, but
assign responsibility to negligent cardholders. Geva 2003; Stephenson 1993.
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This problem has gotten much more serious as multiple credit and debit functions have
begun to reside on a single card and as terminals progressively have lost the ability to accurately
interpret those functions. I address those problems in Mann 2004 and Mann 2004a.
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credit card use motivate cardholders to use their card in an ordinary face-to-face
transaction? Perhaps, you could say, the statute allows the cardholder to overcome the
fear that the shopkeeper might be stealing the card number. For example, the handheld
wireless payment terminals common in Europe apparently are designed to assuage the
concerns of cardholders that a waiter might write down the cardholder’s card number if
the waiter took the card out of the cardholder’s sight. It is difficult to believe, however,
that a concern about that problem is driving the use of cards generally.
Those commonsense understandings are buttressed by the available empirical
evidence about use of cards, which does not seem to be influenced in any obvious way by
the extent of legal protections. For example, the statutory protections for credit card
transactions in the United Kingdom and Canada are relatively similar, while Australia has
no similar protections. Yet, the rates of credit card usage per capita (shown in Figure
One) are almost twice as high in Australia and Canada as they are in the United
Kingdom. Similarly, rates of credit card usage have increased significantly over the last
ten years in many countries, but none of those countries recently has strengthened the
statutory protections for credit cards in any cognizable way.
Finally, and most importantly, the facts of debit card usage are profoundly
inconsistent with the legal-support hypothesis. The United States has by far the most
effective consumer protections for debit cards. Yet as Figure Two shows, debit cards in
the United States have an unusually low share of all card transactions, lower than their
share in countries like Canada, and the United Kingdom, both of which have much more
favorable protections for credit card transactions than they do for debit card
transactions.55
I do not intend to suggest that legal rules are irrelevant. The evidence discussed
above is entirely consistent with the premise that legal rules have some effect on credit
card usage. I merely suggest that the effect of the legal rules appears to be so small that
differences in legal rules do not account for any substantial part of the differing rates of
credit card usage.

2. Cultural Norms of Usage
Another common topic in conversations about differing rates of credit card usage
is differing cultural norms. Some of those norms plainly are important in explaining card
usage in particular places. For example, I am completely persuaded by the suggestion
that Islamic rules that forbid the payment of interest have stifled the development of
credit in countries like Saudi Arabia.56
It is more difficult, however, to develop compelling stories of norms that have
general explanatory power. To illustrate that problem, this section considers the two
most common cultural arguments that I have encountered in my research. First, it is
55
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often asserted that particular countries have such a strong cultural disapproval of
borrowing that the revolving credit available on a credit card is not an attractive product.
I encountered this “frugality” hypothesis myself while studying the Japanese card
market.57 It is not, however, limited to that market; observers also attribute low rates of
card use in southern Europe to a similar norm.58 Under this view, the general rise of
credit cards can be attributed to the gradual assimilation of a global norm that includes
the prodigality characteristic of American society. The other potential norm is a
propensity to use cash that some link to comparatively safe urban environments. This
“fear-of-crime” hypothesis is advanced to explain why cardholders in Japan use cards
relatively little in their safe urban environments, while cards are used much more
commonly in the relatively unsafe United States.59 It is even argued that recent growth of
cards in Latin America can be explained by the lack of safety in some Latin American
countries.60

(a) Frugality
From my perspective, the basic problem with the frugality hypothesis is that it
rests on a parochial view that cultural resistance to consumer borrowing is an artifact of
any particular culture. The stories I heard in Japan about disapproving ancestors sounded
very similar to me to the explanations my grandmother offered to me when I was younger
as to why it was always bad to borrow money. The large role of consumer credit in most
developed countries suggests to me an alternative explanation, that a substantial amount
of consumer credit is a natural attribute of a fully developed economy, and that only some
substantial institutional obstacle will prevent that market from developing.61 To illustrate
that point, Table One shows the ratio of consumer credit to GDP for 2000 for 19
countries.
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Table One: Consumer Credit/GDP62

COUNTRY CONS. CREDIT/GDP (%)
Canada
17.8
USA
16.4
UK
15.9
Singapore
15.1
Japan
14.4
France
12.0
South Korea
11.7
Australia
11.6
Netherlands
10.4
Hong Kong
9.1
Taiwan
8.0
Germany
7.0
Belgium
4.8
Brazil
4.7
Italy
3.9
Spain
3.5
Argentina
3.3
India
2.1
Mexico
0.5

Several things about that table chart are illuminating. First, with respect to the
idea that credit cards are necessary for a high level of consumer credit, consider two
countries that have similar cultures, but strikingly different levels of credit card usage: the
United States at the high end with more than 70 transactions per capita per year and the
UK at the low range with around 20 transactions per year. Both the United States and the
UK are near the top of the consumer credit chart, both with over 15%. Similarly, with
respect to the idea that cultural differences might be driving rates of borrowing, notice
how the continental EU countries (most of which have very low rates of credit card use)
are scattered throughout the distribution, from Spain and Italy at the bottom through
Belgium and Germany in the midrange, to the Netherlands and France near the top.
What I see of importance in the chart, however, is that lesser developed countries
are likely to have a lower level of consumer credit: the three lowest countries are Mexico,
India, and Argentina, doubtless the three least developed countries in that dataset). To
get a sense for what the chart says about more fully developed countries, consider the
62

Based on data from Morgan Stanley.
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example of Japan, which appears near the top of the chart despite a low rate of credit card
borrowing. The answer for Japan in my view is that the policy limitations in Japan that
have limited credit card borrowing have resulted in a shift of the consumer credit market
(at least as compared to other countries) to less savory non-bank lenders such as sarakin
and yenya. Those lenders are considerably more likely to rely on extra-legal means of
enforcing their loans than the banks that have been prevented from developing a credit
card market. In the end, the consumer credit market is about the same size as in other
developed countries. It is just less hospitable to the borrowers that use it.
Of course, the suggestion that consumer credit is more common in countries at an
advanced stage of development is not inconsistent with the view that consumer
borrowing has risen as the frugality characteristic of countries in a natural state is
overcome by the norm of American prodigality that accompanies globalization. If credit
card use has risen generally throughout the world, perhaps the reason is that the pressures
of globalization63 during the last decade have contributed to the development of a single
homogenized culture, of which credit card usage is a significant part. For example, my
studies in both Japan and the United Kingdom make it clear that the leading marketers of
modern revolving credit cards are either American companies or businesses that
consciously adopt the business practices of American companies.64
One problem with the globalization hypothesis is that the data discussed at the
beginning of this part do not seem to indicate a convergence toward United States
practices. On most of the metrics illustrated in the tables above, the United States is an
outlier, not a trendsetter. That evidence buttresses the historical explanation provided
above, which suggests that the situation of the United States depends on attributes of its
history that other countries do not share. If that explanation is correct, then there is little
reason to believe that other countries will end up with same patterns of usage as the
United States. Thus, although the spread of American cultural norms may support the
growth of the credit card to some degree, there is plenty of room for variation that speeds
or retards the rate of growth.
The conflicting intuitions about the data suggested an empirical test to assess
whether the factor that relates to a high level of consumer credit is a high level of
economic development or assimilation of global culture. Accordingly, I regressed the
data above related to consumer credit against indicators of economic development and
globalization. For economic development, I used the level of GDP/capita. For
globalization, I used the globalization index published periodically by Foreign Policy.65
When those metrics were analyzed separately, each was significantly related to the level
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For a general account of those pressures, see Friedman 1999.
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Mann 2002.

65

That index combines normalized data on a variety of things, including trade, foreign
investment, personal contact (through tourism and international travel), international telephone
traffic, and cross-border remittances. See How the Index is Calculated, available at.
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/issue_janfeb_2003/gindexsidebar.html (last visited Dec. 2, 2003).
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of consumer credit as a share of GDP.66 When I combined both metrics in an OLS
regression, however, the globalization index lost its significance. Thus, only the level of
economic development retained any independent explanatory value.67 Although the
evidence of course is rough, and limited to a small number of countries, it does support
the view that the institutional infrastructure associated with economic development is
more likely to explain the level of consumer credit than the decline of cultural aversion to
borrowing.
(b) Fear of Crime
The other major cultural hypothesis is the fear-of-crime hypothesis, the idea that
card use is less common in countries where public places are sufficiently safe to make
ordinary people feel secure in carrying large amounts of cash. Although there may be
something to that hypothesis, it is difficult to believe that it is a major determinant of
variations in card usage.
Several things make it difficult to test that thesis directly. First, because the thesis
relies on a perception of crime that makes individuals reluctant to carry cash, hard
statistical evidence about the frequency of crime cannot respond directly to the thesis.
Recent research by Sara Sun Beale underscores that point, showing that perceptions of
crime and safety are in major part constructed by the media without regard to the reality
of the underlying problems.68
Second, it is difficult to disentangle that thesis from related cultural norms about
cash. For example, one reason people might pay with cash in some countries and credit
cards in others is the status significance the payment has. In the United States, for
example, credit card issuers have succeeded in creating a norm, perhaps less powerful
than it once was, that payment with a credit card can be a sign of status, especially if the
payment is made with a card of a particular color: gold, then platinum, and soon some
rare earth like yttrium I would expect. A payment of $1000 for a restaurant bill in the
United States surely would appear suspicious, if not incriminating evidence of money
laundering. In other countries – Japan being the obvious case – payments with cash carry
a similar status. My time in Japan suggests that there clearly is an element of status in the
ability to disburse large sums of cash to pay for such transactions. It may be that the
duration of such a cash status norm in Japan has links to the relatively large role in the
Japanese economy of underreporting of income and the relative significance of organized
crime in Japan.69 Anecdotal evidence in some sources suggests that a similar pattern
might explain the duration of the use of cash – and the related slow uptake of credit cards
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Each was significant at the 1% level.
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In the multiple regression, GDP per capita was significant at the 5% level. The
adjusted R-squared of the model was 43%. For further details, refer to the Statistical Appendix.
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– in Italy.70 For whatever reason, however, while that norm persists it is difficult to
separate its effects on card usage from the effects of crime.
Finally, the data available to compare crime rates in different countries are
problematic in a number of ways. First, they typically rely on police reports and thus
inevitably understate the true amount of crime. Thus, if the amount by which crime is
understated differs by country, then comparisons may be inaccurate.71 Second, because
the data depend on reports of local enforcement activity, they are based on local
definitions of the various crimes. Those definitions are likely to differ substantially from
country to country.72 Finally, it is not clear which types of crimes would be most likely
to support or undermine the insecurity thesis, because it is not clear what particular
crimes foster the feeling of insecurity that might make the consumer reluctant to carry
cash. On the one hand, property crimes would seem to relate most closely to the actual
risk created by carrying cash. On the other hand, violent crimes like murder are more
likely to be publicized in a way that would cause consumers to become insecure about
their overall safety.
With those caveats in mind, it is still instructive to look at the available data, if
only because data relevant to the thesis are available. To that end, I collected data from
Interpol about crimes in five countries where I also have a substantial time series of data
about credit card spending (Japan, Australia, Canada, the UK, and the United States). I
used two different indices of crime: the total number of crimes/capita reported to Interpol
and the number of murders reported to Interpol. One problem with the Interpol data on
total crimes is that other scholars who have examined the data have confirmed that the
differential underreporting problem discussed above is particularly serious for this data.73
The data on murders perhaps are not subject to that problem, but the crime of murder is
not a particularly ideal predictor for the crimes that would cause a person to be wary of
carrying cash. Overall, however, it may be a useful proxy for the hypothesis in question.
The results of the analysis are inconclusive. As I expected, there is no correlation
between the number of total crimes and credit card spending. Given the problems of data
collection discussed above, that result is not remarkable. However, an initial analysis of
the murder data suggests a positive correlation between murders and credit card
spending.74 For several reasons, however, the data do not suggest a causal link between
murders and credit card spending. For one thing, the data suggested a significant
negative relationship for the United States and Canada, contrary to the positive
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This was analyzed with a regression with robust standard errors to control for
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relationship for the data as a whole. For another, a correlation of the changes of the
variables from year to year with a one-year lag – testing whether credit card spending
would rise or fall one year after changes in the murder rate suggested that the relation was
essentially random.75 In sum, although the data cannot conclusively disprove the crime
hypothesis, they certainly provide little support for it.
*****
To be clear, I do not mean to suggest that cultural norms are unimportant. More
contextualized studies doubtless would reveal a number of cultural practices as powerful
as the Islamic aversion to borrowing. I am skeptical, however, that cultural practices can
provide sufficiently powerful generalizations to be useful in explaining the major currents
of variation and development.

3. Miscellaneous Institutional Precursors
Finally, I address three miscellaneous institutional precursors: merchant size,
economies of scale, and telecommunications costs. Although each of these is likely to
affect in some degree to the success of a cards network, they seem unlikely to be of
sufficient importance to drive the big picture of the success or failure of cards in a large
number of countries.
The first of these is merchant size. I previously suggested that merchant size
might be relevant based solely on the correlation that Japan generally has smaller
merchants than the United States and also lower credit card acceptance.76 That would
make sense as an explanatory factor if there were high fixed costs in merchant acceptance
of the card. The larger the merchant, the more readily profits from potential card
transactions might persuade the merchant to join the network. The more merchants in the
network, of course, the more successful the network. I do not think, however, that those
costs are high enough to limit merchant acceptance. Essentially, the fixed costs are the
costs incurred in buying the terminal. Those costs are at most only a few hundred dollars.
The fixed costs likely would be exceeded by the profits associated with accepting credit
cards for all but the smallest merchants in any market in which cards are widely used.
Thus, I attribute the limited card acceptance in Japan not to the relatively small size of
merchants, but rather to the limited value of accepting cards, driven by the relatively
small value cards provide cardholders in that country.
I also suggested that economies of scale in the size of the country’s card market
might explain the failure of Japan’s card market to grow more rapidly.77 Again, that
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concern seems to have been overstated, largely because of the absence of any fixed costs
that would make market size crucial to entry. Moreover, particularly at this late date, the
business model for implementing a successful payment card is obvious, so there is little
in the way of country-specific planning to be done to introduce cards to a new market that
is any different from the marketing a new issuer does in trying to enter an existing
market.
Third, telecommunications costs seem unlikely to be of crucial structural
importance. Telecommunication costs are likely to be related to fraud, because high
telecommunication costs make it more expensive to do online transactions. When
transactions are authorized online, a real-time verification of the transaction by the
issuer’s computer lessens the risk of fraud. But the costs of fraud are too small compared
to interchange costs to be a likely cause of credit card success as a whole (however likely
they might be to explain competition among different card products). For example, as
Figure Twelve illustrates, even relatively high fraud levels recently experienced in the
UK and Japan have remained below 0.25 percent. For comparison purposes, the
interchange rates in Japan are about one percentage point above those in the United
States.78 The interchange rates in the United States, in turn, are about one percentage
point above those in the United Kingdom.79 Given those much larger interchange-related
cost differentials, it seems unlikely that telecommunication costs that might contribute to
high fraud losses are contributing in a major way to the success or failure of the system.

Figure 12: Credit Card Fraud
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III. CREDIT CARDS AND PRODIGALITY
A. The Problem of Prodigality
It is one thing to know that credit and debit cards are used differently in different
countries. It is another to have some sense of why those differences arise. Once those
questions have been examined, it is natural to inquire what effects credit and debit cards
have on broader aspects of the economy. Those questions are difficult because of the
immense number of variables that affect national and global economic performance in
ways that also might affect the use of credit and debit cards. Still, it is useful to look at
the available data to determine the extent to which they support or undermine concerns
about credit card usage.
Because of the credit function, credit cards potentially have effects on consumers
and the economy as a whole beyond their role as a payment device. Credit card lending
is beneficial to the economy if it substitutes for lending that is less effective or more
expensive. Credit card lending also potentially benefits the economy if lower costs
facilitate the use of credit for value-increasing transactions. Because the transaction costs
for credit card lending are so much lower than they are for competing forms of lending to
small businesses80 and individuals, those effects are important. To put the point more
generally, a robust consumer credit market can substantially increase consumer welfare
and contribute to overall economic growth. It was not entirely insane for the South
Korean government to conclude several years ago that it could increase the growth of its
economy by fostering the increased consumer spending that would come from more
ready availability of consumer credit.81
On the other hand, credit card lending might adversely affect the economy in
several ways. The most problematic is that it might cause excessively prodigal spending
patterns that ultimately lead to financial distress.82 Specifically, the concern is that the
credit card might be too convenient: by making borrowing so convenient that borrowers
do not give adequate concern to the risks of a borrowing transaction, a credit card might
have a unique83 ability to foster prodigal behavior.
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Mann 1997
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Cards International South Korea Country Report
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Another possibility is that excessive credit card spending or debt might adversely affect
the savings rate. Regressions of my data on that question were not conclusive. Those regressions
did produce a negative coefficient – suggesting that the rate of savings does decline with
increases in credit card spending per capita – but the relation explained little of the variation in
rates of savings (8%) and the findings were not statistically significant even at a 10% level.
Details appear in the Statistical Appendix.
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The idea that this is “unique” might be a slight exaggeration. Sullivan, Warren &
Westbrook suggest that the rise of second home mortgages might lead to similar problems by
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Prodigal spending, in turn, plausibly might lead to an increase in financial
distress. The intuition is that credit cards might increase the size of the group of people
who have put themselves in a position where the family unit is unable to withstand some
material adverse change of circumstances – a loss of employment, medical crisis, or the
like.84 This could be attributable to several features of credit card borrowing that make it
categorically more convenient and less reflective than conventional borrowing. Among
other things, the extension of the line of credit is separated from the occasion for
borrowing. Thus, the credit card is issued at one time, based on a statistical assessment
of the cardholder’s ability to repay that provides adequate protection to the lender’s
interest in repayment of future loans. The borrowing, however, takes place later, when
even the minimal formalities of signing the original credit card application are long in the
past.85
The product’s tendency to minimize present-day awareness of the borrowing is
underscored by low minimum payment amounts. Because the monthly payment amounts
associated with initial purchases are so low, some consumers might fail to appreciate the
future significance of the aggregate amount of credit that has been extended. Human
nature suggests that undue use of credit might arise when we couple the elimination of a
focusing event like a loan closing with the tendency to underestimate the true costs of
adverse future events of low probability.86 The experience of Japan is illustrative, where
credit card borrowing appears to be stifled in significant part by a practice requiring the
borrower to state an oral intention to borrow to use a revolving credit feature of a credit
card.87 Similarly, if Calder is right in thinking that beneficial effects of installment credit
arise from the constraining effect of fixed installment payments, the credit card model’s
departure from that practice arguably undermines its normative attractiveness.88
If this concern is true, credit card borrowing is not just a convenient part of
consumer credit; it is a uniquely troublesome piece of the consumer credit puzzle because
it reflects a type of borrowing that is uniquely likely to contribute to an increase in the
risk of financial distress. Assessing the policy implications of that problem is difficult
because of the different perspectives from which the problem can be seen. For example,
a straightforward normative perspective might condemn any increase of financial distress
attendant on credit cards solely because of the human pain and suffering that comes with
financial distress. My goal here is to take a more narrowly economic perspective. From

Warren & Tyagi 2003. Underscoring that possibility, data presented in Demos (2003):11 indicate
that between 1998 and 2001 a large amount of credit card debt was transferred to home equity
loans. Hence, reductions in credit card receivables attributable to those transactions do not reflect
ability to repay the debt, simply a transfer of the debt to a different lender.
84
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that perspective, the problem is that financial distress generates substantial external costs
for the economy, costs that are not borne entirely by the lenders whose debts are not
repaid or by the borrowers that fail to repay them.89 It may be that a system for dealing
with consumer bankruptcy can mitigate those costs. By lowering the costs of financial
distress, bankruptcy systems can foster a variety of activities – including small-business
formation90 – that are crucial to innovation and economic development as a whole.91 But
bankruptcy systems do not eradicate the costs of financial distress, they only lessen
them.92
One of the biggest problems in analyzing the role of credit cards is the difficulty
in obtaining data that captures the key concern – the possibility that credit cards foster a
prodigal impulse that leads to financial distress. For example, it is easy to obtain data
about delinquency rates on credit card accounts and to show that those rates correlate
with consumer bankruptcy filings.93 That is hardly surprising. I expect that careful
analysis would confirm that delinquency rates on automobile loans and home mortgages
also correlate highly with consumer bankruptcy filings.94 But the causal link is highly
debatable. It is at least as likely that the same economic conditions that lead to consumer
bankruptcies also lead to credit card delinquencies as it is that delinquencies on credit
cards cause consumer bankruptcies.
As the previous part suggests, it is possible to obtain aggregate data about credit
card spending and credit card debt from various countries. That evidence, however,
cannot provide direct evidence about the dimensions of that problem. Different
economies could have the same aggregate amount of credit card spending and debt. If it
were distributed in a less responsible (more regressive) way, it would put more people at
risk, and thus have a larger effect on bankruptcy rates. Conversely, if the spending and
debt appears in a more responsible (more progressive) pattern, the same amount of
89
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Efrat 2002; Efrat 2002a.
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Rajan & Zingales 2003.
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In addition, there is the possibility that bankruptcy systems create costs of their own,
principally by lowering the supply of credit. The most prominent of the inconclusive empirical
literature attempting to demonstrate such an effect includes Grant 2001, White 2002 (both
arguing that lenders supply less credit in states with high bankruptcy exemptions). There also is a
body of empirical literature arguing that the costs of bankruptcy are increasing in size, as the
“stigma” of bankruptcy filing declines. Gross & Souleles (1998). To the extent data is relevant
to that claim, data showing that the economic position of consumer bankrupts in this country has
been worsening over the last decade strongly undermines the claim that the stigma of bankruptcy
has been declining. Warren & Tyagi 2003. In any event, the plausibility of that literature is
beyond the scope of this project, which rests on the commonsense premise that financial distress
for consumers is costly to the economy.
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spending and debt might have no significant effect on bankruptcy rates. To look at it
from the familial perspective, the problem is worse when the aggregate amount of credit
card debt is concentrated on a smaller number of families that have borrowed to the brink
than it is when it is spread more uniformly across a large number of families in more
manageable amounts.
Another difficulty with relying on aggregate data to assess the conditions of
individual family units is the large variation in the circumstances and behaviors of
individual family units. For example, we know that a large number of families have both
substantial amounts of liquid assets and substantial amounts of credit card debts.95 Thus,
it is not fair to assume that substantial credit card debt always indicates exposure to
financial distress. It also is clear that the rate of adverse impact from credit card spending
and debt might shift over time if (as seems to be true in the United States) the pool of
credit card users becomes more risky as the market matures.96
The basic difficulty is that it is not easy to use aggregate data on credit-card debt
to separate out the specific reasons that people might have large amounts of that debt. To
understand the problem in an anecdotal way, consider a number of different narratives
that might explain the existing data indicating that people in bankruptcy are likely to have
more credit card debt than people not in bankruptcy.97 Because the different ways in
which people might have incurred the debt have differing degrees of relevance to my
thesis, the difficulty of disentangling them renders it difficult to resolve the problem
through analysis of data.
For example, some people irresponsibly have spent themselves directly into
bankruptcy, with credit cards being the vehicle. That conduct might be condemnable as a
moral matter, but many would think that it would be inappropriate to “blame” the credit
cards rather than the borrower. Nor is it caused in any significant degree by the
borrower’s failure to appreciate consequences of borrowing; the behavior suggests a
calculated indifference to consequences. The available data, however, suggests that those
cases are not a major part of consumer bankruptcies, at least in this country.98
Another group of bankruptcy cases will be associated with a catastrophic family
crisis such as a divorce, loss of job, or medical event. Data from the Consumer
Bankruptcy Project, for example, indicates that one of those three events is present in
87% of bankruptcies involving families with children.99 Evidence of credit card
borrowing in the files of those cases cuts in two directions. First, high credit card
95

For efforts to explain that problem, see Gross & Souleles 2000; Bertaut & Haliassos
2002; Haliassos & Reiter 2003.
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borrowing might reflect rational post-crisis borrowing as a response to the tragedy. For
those families – and even more for the families that resembled them but managed to
avoid bankruptcy – the special features of credit card borrowing might have eased the
difficulty. After all, a rational lender faced with a loan application after the crisis has
come might have declined to extend the credit that the family can obtain so easily from
the existing credit cards. Moreover, there doubtless is a large group of families similar to
those, who engage in heavy crisis-related credit-card borrowing but manage to turn things
around and avoid bankruptcy. For those families, the credit card can be the lifeline by
which they pull themselves out of distress. That borrowing is not profligate in its failure
to consider the future. It is a reasoned reaction to an adverse situation.
Another group of cases involves people who have used credit cards to borrow
enough to put themselves in an unstable position, which left them unable to withstand a
catastrophic event that they otherwise could have weathered.100 Those cases are an
example of the specific problem that is relevant to my thesis. When a family borrows to
the hilt, it does not have any discretionary cash flow available to apply to respond to the
adverse event. Moreover, because by hypothesis the family already has used the credit
that a prudent lender would have extended to it while times were good, it will be difficult
to obtain additional credit to respond to adversity. Although the line between those cases
and the cases of pure recklessness will depend on the perspective of the observer, the data
suggest that a large number of cases will fall here. Those cases are important, because it
is much more plausible from the outside to view the credit cards as a significant part of
the problem.
The aggregate data may be imperfect tools for examining the question, but they
clearly are the best tools available. The only way to examine that question directly would
be to examine a dataset with detailed information about the financial position of
individual family units. Unfortunately, to my knowledge, no such dataset exists for any
country outside the United States. Moreover, even the data available from the United
States is problematic for several reasons. First, if the unique circumstances of the United
States discussed in Part I of this paper make the relation between credit card spending
and consumer bankruptcy in the United States unrepresentative, the United States
evidence will be of little value in assessing how credit cards work generally as opposed to
how they work here.
Moreover, the data from the United States – data from the Survey of Consumer
Finances – is not particularly valuable for the questions I have posed. That data is
derived from consumer responses to questionnaires about the financing position of their
family. Accordingly, it is by definition quite imprecise, and is likely to be particularly
inaccurate for the families in which I am most interested – those that are on the borders of
financial distress because of an inadequate ability to understand the significance of the
amounts that they are spending and borrowing.101 Unfortunately, what little we do know
100
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about that data makes it clear that those families do understate their prodigality. For
example, Warren & Tyagi report that a sample from the Survey of Consumer Finances
understates the expected rates of personal bankruptcy by about 50%.102 Similarly, a
careful analysis by Demos of growth in American credit-card usage during the 1990’s
notes that data from the Survey of Consumer Finances appear to understate credit-card
receivables by about 25%.103 Given those large disparities between the self-reported data
and data collected directly, the most productive approach is to examine data about
aggregate national patterns of borrowing and bankruptcy.

B. The Relation Between Credit Card Debt and Bankruptcy
Acting with the trepidation appropriate in light of that relatively pessimistic
introduction, I compiled a dataset of aggregate nation-level data on credit card spending,
credit card debt, and overall consumer debt. The inquiry had two major purposes. The
first was to separate the specific causal links of credit card use and general consumer
borrowing, to assess the plausibility of the claim that there is a unique problem with
credit card debt. The second was more general, to see how those causal links hold up on
a broader basis, by looking at data outside the United States. If there is nothing to the
prodigality hypothesis – if all debt is equally likely to foster prodigality – then a carefully
constructed statistical model that includes both overall consumer credit and variables for
credit card use would indicate that credit cards have no separate effect on the likelihood
of bankruptcy. More colloquially, the data would disprove my hypothesis if the data
indicate that bankruptcy rates would remain the same at a specific level of overall
consumer borrowing even in the face of increases or declines in the specific amount of
credit-card debt included in that aggregate consumer borrowing. On the other hand, if
credit cards foster prodigality, then we should see a positive relation between credit card
debt and consumer bankruptcy filings, even if consumer credit is held constant.
The statistical analysis is complicated, because we know from some existing
work104 that both credit card debt and consumer credit in this country correlate quite well

card and medical debts are overrepresented in bankruptcy). That kind of data, however, can tell
us little about the earlier stages of the process of prodigality – the slippage from credit card
spending to excessive credit card debt. One paper that makes interesting use of that data is
Lupton & Stafford (2000) (suggesting that a specific portion of the sample becomes increasingly
mired in credit card debt as it grows older).
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with bankruptcy rates.105 However, none of the existing studies has attempted to
disentangle those relationships with statistical care.106 In addition, except for a few
comments about Canada not amplified by quantitative analysis,107 to my knowledge none
of the literature has considered whether similar or different correlations might hold true
in other countries. Accordingly, I have examined those relationships not only for the
United States, but also for the other three countries for which I have been able to collect a
time series of data on consumer bankruptcy and those three variables: the United
Kingdom, Canada, and Australia.
As with most of the data analyzed in this project, there are great difficulties in
constructing a useful data set. For one thing, it is quite difficult – even in this country –
to obtain meaningful data about credit card use. There are no official government
statistics about credit card use and borrowing in this country.108 I rely entirely on
proprietary industry sources such as the Nilson Report. For other countries, a protracted
effort assisted by the intense labors of two of the best law libraries in the country has not
produced even five years of data on the relevant variables for any country other than the

correlate directly with total consumer credit. My purpose is to inquire whether some specific
component of consumer behavior can explain prodigality better than total indebtedness.
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Jones & Zywicki 1999:223 criticizes research on the correlation between debt and
bankruptcy, arguing that the correlation is likely to be spurious because it does not show a
decreased effect related with interest-rate drops in the late 1990’s. The most likely explanation
for that phenomenon is that the interest rates charged to credit card borrowers that actually are
paying substantial sums of interest probably have not fallen so far, both because those rates are
relatively “sticky,” Zywicki 2000, and because of the substantial shift of credit card portfolios to
riskier borrowers during the 1990’s.
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The closest is Stavins 2000, which shows that total credit card debt correlates more
closely with bankruptcy rates in a particular region of the United States than total consumer
credit. But none of the previous studies has even examined the possibility that even credit card
spending – apart from debt – might have any explanatory power. Moreover, the three previous
studies that have examined trends at a national level (Ellis 1998; Lawless 2002; and Mester 2002)
do not control for autocorrelation in the time-series coefficients that they reported and do not
investigate the possibility that lag times might enhance the explanatory power of the analysis.
More broadly, none of those studies has done multiple regressions or attempted to control for the
obvious multicollinearity of the independent variables (credit card debt and consumer credit).
I have obtained a time-series of state-level credit card debt data from cardflash.com. I
plan to analyze that data against a time series of state-level bankruptcy data. Because I do not
have state-level consumer credit data, however, I will not be able to use that analysis to further
my main project here, which is to disentangle the effects of consumer credit generally and of
credit card debt in particular.
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four mentioned above. I would not have the data on those countries without the
assistance of the central banks in the United Kingdom and Canada. Finally, even for the
four countries that I examine, I cannot use extended periods of data, because the data is
meaningful only for periods during which credit card use has existed at a level of
sufficient magnitude for it to have any plausible relation to the economy as a whole. In
any event, even in the United States I have not been able to obtain reliable data on credit
card use for periods before 1990. Accordingly, I necessarily am working with quite a
small dataset.
Continuing with the pessimistic tone, serious problems complicate analysis of the
data that I do have. Most obviously, bankruptcy, the dependent variable for my analysis,
means something quite different in the four countries for which I have been able to
collect data. Among other things, the United States consumer bankruptcy system surely
is more generous than the systems in the other countries. Those differences introduce
considerable “noise” into the data, which should make it difficult to discern any effects
that credit card use might have on bankruptcy filings.
Subject to all of those problems, the results of the analysis are remarkable. Not
surprisingly, credit card debt and consumer credit correlate highly with rates of
bankruptcy filing. At the same time, with those variables held constant, credit card
spending correlates negatively with bankruptcy filing. The reason for that apparently is
that rising spending without an increase in debt should indicate an increase in the ability
to pay for expenditures, a strong indicator of financial strength. What was surprising was
how successful a model could be that tried to explain consumer bankruptcies with just the
three variables of consumer credit, credit card debt, and credit card spending. Using just
those three independent variables, a regression with robust standard errors, with the rate
of bankruptcy filing lagged by one year, predicted a full 83% of the variation in the
consumer bankruptcy filing rates in those countries. The likelihood that the relations
would arise randomly was less than one percent.109
Most interesting of all, the regression model provides standardized coefficients
that allow me to assess whether the different variables have a distinct impact in affecting
bankruptcy rates.110 Those coefficients support the prodigality hypothesis. To be sure,
consumer credit as a whole affects consumer bankruptcy more than credit card debt.
That is common sense. An increase of total debt by $1 million – with credit card debt
held constant – will increase the rate of bankruptcy by more than an increase of credit
card debt of $1 million – with total debt held constant. What is important to me,
however, is the strong effect of credit card debt. An increase of credit card debt by $1
million will increase consumer bankruptcies substantially, even with consumer credit
held constant.
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The use of a time lag in my model – the model suggests that bankruptcy rates rise
one year after the increase in borrowing – is particularly instructive with respect to my
willingness to infer something about causation from the results. It is plausible to think
that an increase in credit card debt causes an increase in bankruptcy filings one year later.
It is not plausible, however, to think that the causation arrow runs in the reverse direction,
that an increase in bankruptcy filings causes an increase in consumer debt one year
earlier.
Accordingly, I conclude that my data provides strong support for the notion that
there is something uniquely prodigal about credit card borrowing.111 The most plausible
counterargument – presented by Todd Zywicki – is that credit card borrowing actually
rises in anticipation of bankruptcy. From that perspective, families borrow excessively
because they expect that bankruptcy will come and they know that they will not have to
repay it.112 My data tends to undercut that hypothesis because the time lag that produced
the best correlations was a year – the bankruptcies lagged the increase in credit card debt
and consumer credit by a year. Zywicki’s thesis would be more plausible with a lag of a
few months at most.113

C. Looking Forward: Credit Card Use and Bankruptcy Law
I close this section with one final point of inquiry: the relation between credit card
use and bankruptcy systems. Rafael Efrat in particular has pressed the idea that
bankruptcy systems are dependent on the nature of the economy of a particular
country.114 He argues generally that a country with a more significant entrepreneurial
sector, or with a less robust safety net, will need to adopt a bankruptcy system that
provides a more generous discharge. That argument resonates with the argument in
recent work by Raghuram Rajan and Luigi Zingales, who generally argue that it is
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Zywicki 2003 argues forcefully that the rise in bankruptcy filings since 1978 is caused
by changes in the bankruptcy system in 1978 and by institutional responses to those changes. See
also Jones & Zywicki 1999:210-15. There certainly is some truth to that argument. For example,
it surely is the case that the bankruptcy system is both more efficient and more generous than it
was before 1978, and it would be surprising if that had not had some effect on bankruptcy filing
rates. But that point seems to me logically unrelated to the analysis that I present here, which
suggests that external economic conditions have an effect on the filings made each year while the
nature of the system is held more or less constant, as it is in each of the jurisdictions during the
time periods that I examine.
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difficult for a free-market system to maintain political viability without safety valves that
lower the harm to those people who are disadvantaged by the system.115
Applying those insights to the problem of credit card usage, we can hypothesize
that high levels of credit card use would be associated with a greater likelihood that a
country would provide a generous bankruptcy discharge.116 Jay Westbrook and his coauthors Terry Sullivan and Elizabeth Warren have advanced a similar hypothesis in an
anecdotal way with respect to consumer credit more generally.117 Drawing on evidence
about the recent spread of consumer bankruptcy protections in Europe, they argue that the
rise of consumer credit has made it necessary to expand the forgiveness available to
overextended consumers.118
The data I have collected suggests considerable support for that hypothesis. I
have divided the countries for which I have substantial data on credit card spending into
three groups,119 based on whether a consumer discharge is automatic,120 discretionary,121
or not available at all.122 Figure Thirteen groups those countries based on the ratio of
credit card spending to GDP. As that figure shows, there is a striking correlation:
countries with more credit card spending are more likely to have an automatic discharge,
those with somewhat less are likely to have a discretionary discharge, and those with the
least credit card spending are likely to have no discharge at all.
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There is of course a substantial controversy in this country about whether the
bankruptcy system for consumers should be made more onerous to increase the incentive for
consumers to repay substantial amounts of credit card debt. Proposals to that effect – so-called
“means-testing” for consumer bankruptcy – are central to the proposed bankruptcy reform bill
that has been passed in various forms by the House and Senate over the last several years. I am
deeply skeptical of the value of those reforms, based on the empirical evidence that strongly
suggests that the administrative costs of those reforms (borne largely by the judicial system and
taxpayers) will dwarf any recoveries by creditors. Compare Culhane & White 1999 with Jones &
Zywicki 1999:189. The question is complicated because, among other things, of the likelihood
that some of the people pushed into Chapter 13 by the new program might have a greater than
average change to complete their plans. Jones & Zywicki 1999.
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Figure Thirteen:
Discharge and C/C Spending
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Statistical analysis of the data confirms the significance of the disparity suggested
by that simple figure. Pairwise T-tests comparing each of the three categories found a
distinction, statistically significant at the 5% level, between the automatic category and
each of the other two categories.123 Even between the discretionary and no-discharge
categories, the distinction was significant at just above the 5% level.124 Given the small
number of observations (only five for that last test), the relation is highly suggestive.
It is not immediately obvious how to interpret that relationship. For one thing, the
absence of a discharge could simply be another aspect of the same legal cultures that tend
to limit credit card spending. As discussed above, legal systems that limit the free flow
of consumer credit information tend to have low levels of consumer credit generally and
credit card debt specifically. It is possible that those same cultures simply find the idea
of a bankruptcy discharge distasteful. From this perspective, the common grant of a
discharge by Anglo-American countries125 is just another part of the legal heritage that
coincidentally results in high rates of credit card spending. The recent spread of
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The analysis indicated that the chances that the results were random was 0.041
(comparing automatic to discretionary) and 0.035 (comparing automatic to no discharge). The
statistical appendix reports more details of the analysis.
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bankruptcy in Europe, however, following shortly upon the rise of consumer credit in
those countries, however, makes it difficult to give that concern decisive weight.126
There are, of course, other possibilities. For example, one possibility is that a
country might think that it could lower credit card debt by stiffening or removing its
bankruptcy discharge entirely. That seems most unlikely. As discussed above, there are
a number of reasons for the spread of the credit card, and the availability of a bankruptcy
discharge seems unlikely to be an important one. On a transaction-by-transaction basis,
the value to the typical consumer of a bankruptcy discharge – even in a conspicuously
profligate country like the United States – cannot be a fraction of the value to the
consumer of such attributes of the transaction as the easy availability of credit or the
affinity benefits I discuss below. So the removal of a bankruptcy discharge seems most
unlikely to alter the spending habits of the country as a whole.
A more plausible possibility is that a country that experiences large amounts of
consumer credit delinquencies would feel compelled to enact some form of discharge as
the only practical method of dealing with the problem. In addition to the recent evidence
from Europe discussed above, Bruce Mann’s work on colonial America provides more
contextualized support for that idea. He explains how the pressures of business failure in
a growing entrepreneurial class led up to the passage of the first national bankruptcy act
in 1800.127
The results reported in this section are only suggestive. Much more information
needs to be collected to form a complete understanding of the relation among credit card
use, consumer credit, and bankruptcy systems. Most obviously, it would aid in
understanding the political ramifications of not having a bankruptcy system if we knew
more about exactly what happens to distressed debtors in countries that do not provide a
discharge. At the same time, the rapid shift in the demographics of bankrupt debtors
here128 suggests that it would be useful to know more about the demographics of
bankruptcy debtors in other countries. Greater knowledge about that point would make it
much easier to assess the influence on public policy of the distress those debtors are
experiencing.

IV. POLICY RESPONSES
Despite the difficulty in locating decisive data about the positive and negative
effects of credit cards, many countries have implemented a variety of regulatory
proposals designed to limit the negative effects the cards are thought to have. This part
of the paper discusses some of the most obvious responses that are suggested by existing
practices and literature, as well as a few new proposals of my own. Because of the highly
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normative focus of the discussion that follows, it is important at the outset to explain the
perspective from which I evaluate those proposals.
First, as I have mentioned more than once, a complete account of the economic
effects of the credit card must recognize the positive contributions the credit card makes
to a market economy. As a payment system, it doubtless is one of the most efficient
vehicles ever devised. For one thing, because transaction authorization, processing, and
payment proceeds on an almost entirely electronic basis, it is an order of magnitude
cheaper than the traditional paper-based payment systems (such as checks) that it has
supplanted. Given the difficulties market actors have had in building sufficient networks
to penetrate the consumer market with electronic payment systems that are not cardbased, it is a testament to the value that the credit card provides that it has penetrated that
market so pervasively.
The benefits of electronic processing are even more striking for the credit
transactions effectuated with the card. If a credit card is a lot cheaper for a bank to
process than a check, consider how much cheaper it is for a consumer to borrow $300
with a credit card than it would be to borrow the same amount of money through a
conventional bank loan. Putting aside the fees that the bank loan would involve, the
activities of traveling to the bank, explaining the purpose of the purchase, and verifying
the consumer’s creditworthiness are likely to be tens if not hundreds of times as timeconsuming as the parallel credit card process, even if we include the time spent filling out
the limited amount of information required on a modern American credit card
application.
Similarly, repeating a point made earlier, the separation between the point of
underwriting and the point of borrowing makes credit card lending particularly valuable
as a safety net for consumers in distress. Distressed families can use credit cards to
respond to financial crises even after the crises has occurred. It is much less likely that
they could obtain conventional bank financing at such a time.
It is difficult to balance those benefits against the costs of credit cards discussed in
the preceding part of this paper. Accordingly, it is at least possible that the costs
discussed in the preceding part of this paper exceed the benefits of credit cards by such a
degree that it would be appropriate to ban credit cards entirely. My intuitive sense,
however, is that those benefits are quite substantial in relation to the costs. Hence, I
reject reforms that would have the purpose or effect of banning particular credit card
transactions. Thus, my goal is to design reforms that are likely to respond directly to the
problem identified above – prodigal borrowing. Generally, I am trying to design reforms
will alter the decisions of consumer borrowers so as to avoid imprudent borrowing,
without at the same time removing the ability of the product to provide the benefits that
come with it.
I am sensitive to the risk that I might fall into the easy compromise – so typical of
American consumer regulation – of adopting purely informational protections that
expend resources without altering consumer behavior in any noticeable way. I hope that
the discussion that follows evinces adequate concern to design reforms that can target the
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transactions that are problematic, without hindering the value-increasing transactions for
which cards are used. The discussion proceeds in three parts: crude reforms that exclude
banks from the market; price regulation, imposing a government-determined price at one
or more steps in the credit card process; and marketing and information regulation,
limiting the types of programs issuers can use to stimulate consumer use of their
products, with a view to stimulating more rational use of cards.

A. Excluding Banks from the Market
The broadest policy response would be to exclude banks from the market for
credit cards. I have argued above that banks are uniquely situated in the early stages of a
credit card market to introduce and deploy a profitable credit card product. If that is true,
then an exclusion of banks from the market could slow or prevent the broad growth of
credit cards.
That possibility is suggested by the example of Japan. As I have explained in
prior work, Japan directly excluded banks from offering revolving credit products until
quite recently.129 Parallel to that policy is a strikingly slow rate of growth for cards. As
Figure Nine shows, rates of card usage in Japan are far below what would be expected
for such a thoroughly globalized economy.
To be sure, the evidence suggests that Japan took that course not because it
wanted to discourage credit cards, but because it wanted to ensure that finance companies
rather than banks would earn the profits from such operations.130 Still, the example offers
empirical evidence of the effects of such a policy. The basic message of that evidence is
that such a policy might slow credit card use, but it seems unlikely to have a substantial
effect on the growth of consumer credit. As Figure Eight shows, the ratio of consumer
credit to GDP in Japan is comparable to that of other developed countries,
notwithstanding its very low rate of credit card use.
Thus, the principal effect of that policy in Japan has not been to slow the growth
of consumer credit overall, but simply to slow the use of credit cards. The analysis
discussed above suggests that a shift from credit card borrowing to other means of
borrowing might stem the financial distress that otherwise might arise from the relevant
borrowings. In this case, however, the policy arguably has had other deleterious effects.
Specifically, it seems to have shifted the providers of consumer credit. Instead of
thoroughly regulated banks, the consumer credit is provided by less regulated, less savory
lenders in groups such as sarakin [pay-day lenders] and yenya [moneydealers], for whom
the primary enforcement mechanism is not Japan’s notoriously lenient judicial system,
but the less forgiving organized crime groups such as the yakuza. It should be no surprise
that the long-run effect of a regulation-driven market vacuum would not be the absence
of products, but instead a prompt inrush of other competitors to whom the regulatory
129
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exclusion did not apply. That suggests that simple exclusion of banks from the market is
not likely to be an effective response.

B. Regulating Prices
A second class of regulatory responses responds to the price structure of the
credit-card network, particularly the differential prices that merchants face when they
accept credit cards rather than other competing payment systems. In other countries,
regulators have imposed a variety of constraints – primarily with regulations directly
setting prices merchants (and their banks) pay to issuers for credit card services. This
section discusses the general problem and then a series of possible policy responses.

1.

The Problem

One problem that has persistently troubled regulators in the credit card market has
been the relation between the costs merchants bear when they accept credit cards and the
prices they pay their customers. Specifically, regulators in Australia, the EU, and the UK
have reasoned that credit cards are much more expensive for merchants to accept than
competing payment systems, and that the failure of merchants to pass on those charges to
credit card users results in a cross-subsidization of credit card users by other
customers.131 The result, in that line of reasoning, is that merchants charge higher prices
to all customers to cover the costs of accepting credit cards from some of their
customers.132 The problem is that if the different payment systems have different costs to
the merchant, but similar costs to the purchaser (effectively no cost to the purchaser), the
purchaser’s choices will not match the merchant’s preferences.
Affinity programs (frequent-flier miles, cash-back programs, and the like) make
the problem worse than that framework suggests. Many users will choose a product
because of the opportunity to receive cash back or airline miles for their use of that
131
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product. It is understandable that the users do not take account in that choice of the
higher costs that merchants pay for the credit card.
At the outset, it is important to note that the factual premise of that argument is
unclear. There is to my knowledge no reliable data on the actual “all-in” costs that
merchants pay for accepting varying forms of payment.133 As an electronic payment
method in which the issuer bears the risk of unauthorized transaction, the credit card has
the difficulty that all of the costs that the merchant pays are transparently priced in a
single fee – in the range of 1.5 to 2% for high-quality retail merchants in the United
States, but significantly higher and lower in other countries. In Japan, for example, the
rate typically is 3% or more.134 In the EU, in contrast, the rate generally is below 1%.135
It is clear that debit cards – especially PIN-based debit cards – are considerably
cheaper for merchants; this is easy to see because their pricing is as transparent as the
pricing of credit cards.136 But debit cards continue to be dwarfed in the United States at
least by checks and by cash.137 It is not nearly so clear how much it costs merchants to
accept those instruments. In the case of checks, for example, merchants commonly incur
fees in the range of one-half of a percent to verify the check. That service does not
include a guarantee of payment, but only a check of the item against a “hot-check” list of
known bad-check writers and, in a few cases, against an expert-system program designed
to detect questionable patterns of check use that suggest fraud. Thus, even after that
payment, merchants bear some residual risk of loss from dishonored checks and, in some
cases, from unauthorized items.138 Merchants also often will pay fees to their banks on a
per-item basis when they deposit checks.139 Most importantly, checks are the most timeconsuming payment system to process – they slow checkout lines in a way that imposes
costs difficult to evaluate, but certainly important to merchants. Therefore, it is hard to
be sure precisely how much more it costs merchants to accept a credit card than a check.
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Similarly, even cash is not entirely free as a payment system for merchants.
Merchants that receive payments in cash are much more vulnerable to theft – cash is, of
course, near the top of the list of the most convenient assets from which thieves can
profit. Thus, merchants presumably bear higher expenses in security procedures for the
cash. Also, although I have not been able to locate data quantifying this point, I
understand that commercial customers typically pay fees to their bank for depositing
large amounts of cash.140
Still, despite those quibbles, it seems likely that the net costs of merchants are
greater when they receive payment by credit card than they are when they receive
payment in other ways. Thus, assuming that merchants do not charge differentially
(more) for credit card payments than they do for other payments, there is a problem. In
one sense, the problem might be that those who pay with cash, checks, and debit cards
are subsidizing those who pay with credit cards. Tying the matter back to the preceding
part of the article, however, the problem might be seen more seriously as a situation in
which consumers have an inappropriately high incentive to use credit cards. The natural
question, then, is whether there is any useful policy that might respond to that problem.
2. Responses
The most logical way to think about that question is to consider the prices charged
among the various parties to a credit card transaction. Looking at the credit card system
in its simplest form, there are three different pricing interfaces: the interface between the
customer and the merchant; the interface between the merchant and the credit-card issuer
(or network); and the interface between the credit-card issuer and the customer. Plausible
policy responses could address any of those three interfaces.

FIGURE 14: PRICING INTERFACES
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(a) Merchant Price Discrimination
The simplest response to that problem would be for merchants to charge
customers different prices based on the payment system with which customers pay. That
would address the problem of cross-subsidization directly. Furthermore, if merchants
could price differentially based on the amount each card charged them, that practice
might lead to greater competition in the market for the rates merchants pay when they
accept cards. Finally, with respect to the issues raised in the preceding part, higher
charges for card use might stem casual use to some degree. The existing evidence – from
a policy in Norway that caused banks to charge customers per-item fees for checks, but
not debit card transactions – suggests that customers are highly sensitive to such charges
and would switch payment systems quickly to avoid such charges.141 The natural
question, then, is why in a competitive retail market – something that certainly exists in
this country – merchants do not charge their customers differentially based on the
payment system that they select.
One answer in the United States is a wrongheaded legal system. For a time,
federal law actually barred any price discrimination at all between cash and credit card
transactions.142 Current law has reversed that policy in part – TILA § 167 bars card
issuers from any policy that would prevent merchants from granting discounts for
payments by methods other than a credit card. Thus, discounts for non credit card
payments are now lawful. That change has only a limited practical effect, however,
because the card networks have rules that prevent merchants from imposing surcharges
on credit card use. At first glance, that would seem only a detail. But the problem is that
a surcharge-only system requires merchants to price all credit card transactions in the
same way – it does not permit, for example, distinctions between different types of credit
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cards based on distinctions in their merchant-discount rates.143 A more speculative
reason offered by Frankel is that it may be more acceptable in the retail marketplace for a
merchant to charge for credit card use – a service offered the customer for which the
merchant must pay – than to discount for cash, which could suggest to the casual
consumer that the merchant’s price might have an unduly high margin of profit.144
Whatever the reason, the legislative history of TILA suggests that credit card
issuers fought hard for the right to bar surcharges, which suggests that the right is
valuable to them.145 Assuming that they were rational in fighting that battle, it is
plausible to think that the battle the credit card issuers won amounts to a substantial
restraint on the practical ability of merchants to discriminate in pricing. If that is so, then
the existing statutory policy does not really go far enough to foster full competition at the
point of sale in merchant-discount rates.
Another reason why we see so little price discrimination is the costs of
implementing it. It is not costless for merchants to construct a system that subtracts a
specified discount from transactions that are made with cash or other non-credit payment
systems. Decisions must be made about the appropriate size of the discounts and the
transactions to which they will apply – will checks be covered or will their higher costs
justify a smaller discount? Sales terminals must be programmed to reflect the new
program. Customers must be educated about the program. Those costs may not be
overwhelming, but if they are substantial, and if merchants worry that customers will
rebel (as experience suggests they will) at paying more to use a credit card, then
merchants rationally might forgo investment in such programs.
Although the recent decision in the Wal-Mart case will increase competition
among payment systems at retail, it does not respond to this particular problem at all. In
that case, Visa and MasterCard agreed to pay several billion dollars to settle antitrust
allegations brought by leading retailers that generally had required any retailer that
accepts a Visa or MasterCard credit card also to accept the debit cards offered by Visa
and MasterCard.146 The remedies also permit those retailers henceforth to refuse to
accept the debit card products.147 Recent news stories suggest, for example, that WalMart soon will stop accepting the MasterCard debit product (MasterMoney).148 The
expected result is some combination of a drop in the market share of those products or a
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significant decline in the prices that Visa and MasterCard can charge merchants that
accept them. But that litigation did not challenge the anti-surcharge provisions of the
agreements Visa and MasterCard have with those merchants. Indeed, if anything, the
litigation illustrates the market power that Visa and MasterCard have in setting the terms
of those agreements. Accordingly, the persistence of anti-surcharge provisions in those
agreements tells us nothing about the optimality of those provisions.
On the other side of the topic, there is one obvious problem with encouraging
payment-system price discrimination, the historical evidence about the circumstances in
which that discrimination exists currently. To the extent charges for credit card use
appear in present circumstances, they tend to be in circumstances where merchants as a
practical matter have high amounts of bargaining power, so that the fees are simply used
to extract a greater share of the surplus from a particular transaction.149 To offer an
anecdotal example, in England (where credit card surcharges are permitted), it is common
for taxicabs that accept credit cards to charge substantial service fees to do so (in the
range of 10% of the transaction amount). Those examples should give us pause before
acting vigorously to cause more of that kind of conduct. My impression, however, is that
in most important contexts in this country consumers have enough choices in merchants
and payment mechanisms that unreasonably high surcharges will not lead to customers
paying extortionate fees; they will lead to customers selecting different merchants or noncredit payment systems.
This discussion suggests two things about merchant price discrimination as a
policy lever. First, it is at least plausible that a major reason that merchant-price
discrimination is not common is because it is not profitable for most merchants. If that is
true, then it is difficult to imagine a change in the legal system that would cause
merchants generally to begin charging such fees. At the same time, there is some reason
to believe that we would see more merchant price discrimination if legislatures
invalidated network rules that prohibited surcharges. To the extent that kind of price
discrimination would result in consumer choices more responsive to the true costs of the
choices, it is probably a good thing, even if it occurs only incrementally. It is difficult to
discern substantial adverse effects. On balance, then, a reform to permit credit card
surcharges seems appropriate.

(b) Interchange Rates
A second approach would be to remove or lessen the differential, by regulation of
the rates that merchants pay. To that end, a common policy initiative proposed in recent
years has been the regulation of interchange rates.150 The Reserve Bank of Australia
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recently has implemented rules that lowered interchange substantially for Visa and
MasterCard transactions.151 After litigation before the European Commission, Visa has
settled a dispute resulting in substantially lower interchange rates for cross-border
transactions.152 The Office of Fair Trading in the United Kingdom153 is in the final stages
of proceedings that will result in the imposition of a much lower interchange rate on
MasterCard transactions in that country (with inevitable subsequent proceedings against
Visa).154
The premise of those initiatives is straightforward. The view is that the
interchange rate is a fee that the issuer of a credit card charges the merchant (or the
merchant’s financial institution) for extending credit, for processing the transaction, and
for bearing the risk that the transaction is unauthorized. Those initiatives call upon the
networks to provide data about the extent to which the costs that the issuers bear exceed
their non-interchange revenues. The regulators then attempt to set an interchange fee that
matches the excess costs that the issuers can document. The economic justification for
the intervention generally is the one discussed above: that the high costs of credit cards to
merchants, coupled with the absence of meaningful merchant-price discrimination,
results in a generally higher level of retail prices for all consumers, even those that do not
use credit cards.
There are two major problems with those initiatives. The first is that it is difficult
to reconcile them with the economics literature about the role of interchange fees in
payment-card networks.155 The principal writers are Schmalensee (at MIT), Wright (in
New Zealand), and Rochet and Tirole (in France). Generally, those writers have focused
on the economics of payment-card networks as a multi-sided platform that can become
successful only through arrangements that make the card profitable for issuers,
merchants, and consumers. The literature suggests that a complex array of factors would
relatively competitive, regulation of interchange fees is expected indirectly to lower the costs that
merchants pay. For simplicity, the discussion in the text ignores the role of the acquirer.
151
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be relevant in determining the optimal interchange rate. First, as the network grows,
interchange generally should fall. The increasing volume of users and merchant
acceptors allows economies of scale in transaction processing, which lowers the
percentage rate necessary to cover the costs of processing the transactions. Thus,
interchange rates have fallen in the United States from 6% when the payment card began
to the vicinity of 2% now.
Similarly, interchange rates reflect the general structure of the network. If the
network is one in which borrowing rates are relatively high, the profits of providing
credit provide substantial revenues to issuers, which lower the need for a high
interchange rate. Conversely, the absence of such revenues requires a higher interchange
rate. That is why interchange rates for American Express in the United States are still
about 3% and why interchange rates in Japan are 3% despite the relatively large size of
its market.156
A final set of factors are probably the most controversial and difficult to analyze.
Specifically, a sophisticated network could use the interchange rate to balance the need to
make the product more attractive to merchants and to users. The rate would rise in
markets where merchant penetration was so high that the marginal effects of higher
interchange would have a low effect on merchant acceptance. The rate would fall in
markets where lower interchange might spur increased merchant penetration.
Conversely, interchange would rise in markets where lowering the costs to consumers
could increase cardholder usage.157 Thus, in the United States where merchant
penetration is almost universal, interchange rates are substantially higher (close to 2%)
than in countries like the UK, Australia, and the continental EU, where rates are closer to
1%, even in markets without any substantial amount of credit card debt. The need to
foster merchant acceptance in those countries makes it imprudent to raise interchange
rates any higher.
Assessing the propriety of those rates, the literature generally suggests that the
market would result in an optimal rate, at least if there were adequate competition among
retail merchants.158 That assumption is particularly problematic, because the expectation
is that adequate competition would result in “frictionless merchant surcharging” that
would dissipate the ability of issuers to build a network through the use of excessive
interchange fees.159 Generally, the idea is that if interchange rates were too high, some
merchants would charge lower prices for non-card transactions, which would lead to
lower card usage, which would cause the networks to lower the interchange rates to make

156

Mann 2002.

157

Baxter 1983; Gans & King 2001; Gans & King 2003; Rochet & Tirole 2002a;
Schmalensee 2002; Wright 2001.
158

Gans & King 2001; Katz 2001; Rochet & Tirole 2002a; Schmalensee 2002; Wright

159

Katz 2001.

2001.

50

Credit Card Policy

51

February 16, 2004 Draft

the cards more attractive to merchants. As discussed above, we certainly do not see
frictionless merchant surcharging at this time.
Another possibility – not one that the models emphasize – is that competition
between card networks could result in appropriate interchange rates.160 The idea is that a
network that did a poor job of setting the interchange fee would lose business – either
merchants, cardholders, or both – to a competing network that had a more optimal fee
structure. Thus, the networks would be highly motivated to develop optimal fee
structures. It is difficult to assess that concern, but it is plain that in all markets
competition among card networks occurs – if at all – in a highly concentrated setting. It
also is plain that the rates that Visa and MasterCard charge are quite similar. This does
not prove that there is no competition – there are frequent anecdotal reports of significant
competition on interchange fees between American Express, on the one hand, and Visa
and MasterCard on the other.161 But that competition tends to be in the nature of Visa
and MasterCard convincing merchants to stop taking American Express because of its
higher interchange fees. It is not clear that there is substantial competition over
interchange fees between Visa and MasterCard. Indeed, evidence adduced in the recent
litigation over cross-border currency fees suggests the likelihood of a high degree of
conscious parallelism in price setting by the two leading networks.162
Thus, a fair reading of the economics literature would justify regulators in
concluding that the existing interchange rates are not validated as “efficient” or “correct”
by the fact that the marketplace has created them. That does not mean, however, that
rates selected by the regulators are likely to be superior to the rates that exist in the
marketplace. For one thing, the economics literature strongly suggests that the purpose
of the interchange fees is not to allow issuers to recoup out-of-pocket costs for transaction
processing. The purpose of the interchange fees is to balance the relative marginal
attractiveness of the products to the classes of merchants and consumers that use the
cards. It would be only happenstance if that balance happened to match any accountingbased analysis of the costs of the issuers or the networks. Second, the complexity of the
relevant variables suggests that it would be a fruitless task for regulators to undertake to
set an interchange rate based on the economic analysis. It is doubtful that even the credit
card networks can do a perfect job of setting that rate. It is hard to believe that regulators
can do it better than poorly.
More generally, the discussion in Part II suggests a broader problem almost
entirely absent from either the existing initiatives or the literature that criticize them: the
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possibility that credit card use has adverse effects entirely apart from its effect on retail
pricing. Given the general unwillingness of merchants to price discriminate, the
likelihood that consumer prices are elevated to any substantial degree by the arguable
cross-subsidization of credit card purchasers seems less important than the plain and
quantifiable correlations between credit card spending and bankruptcy discussed in the
previous section. If there is a substantial adverse social cost to credit cards, that social
cost surely lies in the problem of prodigality discussed in the previous section, not in their
effect on retail pricing.
That problem is entirely absent from the analysis of the economic models. The
models do not even purport to justify interchange fees with respect to that issue. Their
goal is to derive an interchange fee that is optimal in the sense that it maximizes the value
of the credit card network, generally by maximizing usage of the network. If increasing
usage of the network imposes social costs on third parties – as it would if credit card debt
causes prodigality – then maximizing usage of the network is not an appropriate
benchmark by which to judge the appropriate level of the interchange fee.
That problem only aggravates the difficulty that regulators face in developing an
appropriate interchange rate. To me, the intractability of those questions suggests that
regulators are not focused on the right interface. Their concern is at the interface between
the acquiring bank and the merchant, where a high interchange rate results in a higher
level of retail prices. Part II suggests that the more serious problem is at the interface
between the consumer and the merchant, where the divergence between the social and the
private costs leads the consumer to select the credit card. I have suggested above one
reform designed to make it more likely that merchants will elevate the costs they charge
at that point. I turn now to another way to address that problem.

(c) Affinity Programs
The discussion above suggests – at least as a fruitful avenue for inquiry – an
entirely new approach. If the key problem is the divergence of private and social cost for
the consumer at the point of purchase, then perhaps one appropriate regulatory response
is to mitigate that divergence by taking away the carrot that gives the credit card a
significantly negative cost for the consumer that uses it. Specifically, why not prohibit
affinity programs? All of them – cashback,163 airline miles,164 anything that is a tangible
benefit that a third party awards to the consumer based on the consumer’s choice to
borrow at the point of sale. These programs are a major part of the competition by which
different issuers retain customers and encourage them to spend.165 The variety of the

163

CCM1002:54.
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Airline miles are one of the most successful benefits. CCM1201:50; CCM0503:14.
To get a sense for their value, airline miles are sold in a secondary market at about 2.75 cents per
mile. CCM1201:50.
165

CCM0802:30. 77 out of 84 (92%) banks responding to a recent Federal Reserve
survey of card terms have such a program. www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/shop/tablwb.pdf.
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programs is increasing rapidly, as technological advances permit ever greater
differentiation of benefits.166 For example, a burgeoning product that is closely related to
the products that I discuss here provide benefits not to the consumer but to a third party
organization of interest to the consumer; a recent program by Providian issues
Democratic National Party credit cards.167 A prohibition of those programs would
directly increase the cost to the consumer of using a credit card and thus would do much
to mitigate the cross-subsidization problem that has troubled overseas regulators so much.
It is less clear precisely what the effect would be on the prodigality problem that
is the focus of this paper. It does seem likely that a ban on affinity programs would
reduce credit card usage. First, the fact that debit card usage is rising so rapidly even in
the United States – where affinity programs are pervasive for credit cards and uncommon
for debit cards – suggests that consumers in fact perceive a cost to them in accepting the
credit offered on a credit card. See Figure Eight. Second, as discussed above, the
limited available evidence suggests that consumers are highly sensitive even to small peritem transaction charges. In this context, for example, one recent story trumpeted the
market advantages of a program that provides affinity benefits as a device to help
persuade tenants in Manhattan to use credit cards to pay their rent.168 Thus, a shift in the
relative advantages of different payment systems – lowering the per-transaction
attractiveness of the credit card by approximately 1% – might shift consumers away from
credit cards in a significant way.
But a reduction in credit card usage does not directly match a reduction in
imprudent credit card borrowing. The best evidence on the effect such a reform might
have on credit card borrowing could come from Germany. Press reports suggest that the
2001 repeal of a similar law in Germany have been followed by rapid increases in credit
card usage.169 It is not clear yet, however, whether that increase in usage will lead to a
substantial increase in credit card debt.170
There is one narrow group of affinity programs, however, that do not raise that
problem, a rising group of programs that condition the affinity benefits on a cardholder’s
bill-payment practices. Specifically, those program provide affinity benefits only to
166

CCM0602:26 (discussing benefits provided at the register based on the profile of the
particular customer).
167

Jennifer Bayot, Credit Card Lets Democrats Shop with Party Loyalty, NEW YORK
TIMES, Jan. 20, 2004, at C8.
168

Rachelle Garbarine, Paying Rent by Credit Card, and Dreaming of Waikiki, NEW
YORK TIMES, Dec. 29, 2003, at A17. Lest there be any doubt about it, there is some reason to
think that the credit card issuers pressing these programs expect that some of the payments will
not be repaid during the first billing cycle.
169

CCM0103:16 (statement of Visa executive that “Germany is going loyalty-made since
[the repeal of the so-called Rabattgesetz law]).
170

Unfortunately, despite correspondence with the German central bank, I have not been
able to obtain data about credit card debt in Germany.
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cardholders that do not repay their bills completely each month.171 Another variant
(offered by American Express) increases the amount of the normal affinity benefit for
those cardholders that carry a monthly balance.172 In a sense, those programs provide
affinity benefits out of the interest revenues earned by the issuers. Because they are tied
directly to borrowing, they do not present the problem discussed above. Thus,
prohibition of those programs would both respond to the cross-subsidization problem and
the prodigality problem.
At first glance, of course, such a program seems politically insane, because it
suggests a statute designed to protect consumers by taking away from them something
that they like. But that should not be surprising. The basis for regulatory intervention
would be frankly paternalistic: that consumers do not accurately understand the costs of
credit extended to them and that they are particularly vulnerable to prodigality when the
credit is extended through the convenience of a credit card.
Another obvious concern is that eliminating affinity programs would simply make
credit card issuing even more profitable than it is now. To understand that point,
consider data from Australia, where affinity programs are much less pervasive than they
are here: there, affinity programs cost about forty-six cents per transaction, about 20% of
all of the expenses of issuers on their card programs.173 Removing those costs would
raise the profits of card issuers substantially. But that assumes that all of the pricing is
entirely independent, and that removal of affinity expenses would have no effects on the
prices set at the other exchange points in the network.
As discussed above, that is a naïve view of the economics of credit card networks.
It is much more plausible to think that credit card markets are relatively competitive
despite the highly oligopolistic structure.174 Data from Australia, for example, suggests
that the amount by which issuer revenues exceed the costs of their operations and a
reasonable profit is almost exactly the amount by which they subsidize their cardholders
with affinity programs.175 That suggests that in the relative near-term a ban on affinity
programs would result in a drop in interchange rates through the simple press of
competition, as outlined in the economic models about the rational operation of a card
171

Lieber 2003.
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Gans & King 2001.
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The most persuasive empirical evidence is an analysis of the cost efficiency of credit
card banks, which suggests that they are generally as competitive as other American banks.
Kulasekaran & Shaffer 2002. Studies relying on data from industry profits and pricing practices
have drawn markedly inconsistent conclusions. Compare Brito & Hartley 1995 (favorable
assessment of competitiveness of American credit card industry); Jones & Zywicki 1999 (same);
Zywicki 2000 (same), with Ausubel 1991 (reasoning that the American credit card industry is not
competitive because credit card interest rates do not drop when the cost of funds in the industry
falls).
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Gans & King 2001.
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network. If that occurs, then the cross-subsidization problem would be mitigated from a
second side, reducing the cost differential that merchants face (as well as the negative
cost that attracts consumers).
This proposal is a tentative one, primarily a suggestion for exploration. There are
quite a number of details that would have to be worked out in the process of
implementation. For example, the proposal at the beginning of this section refers to
benefits provided by third parties. I doubt it would be useful for the proposal to apply to
retailer cards. In the context of retailer cards, an affinity program is simply a discount for
volume purchasing. Because the seller receives all of the revenue from the covered sales
transaction, those cards do not raise the same price-discrimination problems as those
raised by third-party cards.176 Similarly, card issuers (especially those in the high-end
market) often provide a variety of nonmonetary benefits to cardholders that often are not
tied directly to purchases (access to travel counselors, personal shoppers, concierge
assistance, etc.)177 The logic of the proposal suggests that it should be limited to
consideration that is directly attributable to a particular purchase or group of purchases;
that problem raises some definitional challenges.
In the end, the plausibility of this proposal probably depends on the perspective of
the regulator in question. A regulator highly motivated to solve the cross-subsidization
problem might view the broad proposal as an important option. A regulator less
interested in that problem and more troubled by the prodigality problem discussed in Part
II might be concerned that the proposal interferes with market transactions that are not
tied with sufficient directness to the problem. A regulator that both thinks the prodigality
problem is serious and is convinced that any decline in credit card spending would
mitigate the prodigality problem should think this proposal is quite valuable. Finally, any
regulator that takes the prodigality problem seriously should want to prohibit affinity
programs that reward carrying a monthly balance. Thus, those programs offer a good
place to start any such prohibition.

C. Regulating Information
A final group of proposals related to the regulation of the information available to
consumers. If the problem of prodigality in fact rests on a failure to appreciate the “true”
risks of credit card borrowing, then regulation of information can be productive. Indeed,
because regulation of information often can be implemented without directly barring
transactions in which parties wish to engage, information regulation has the value of
being less paternalistic than direct prohibition of suspect transactions. As discussed
above, the difficulty of separating “good” borrowing from “bad” borrowing makes those
kinds of direct prohibitions difficult to design in a useful way. Moreover, there always is
the risk mentioned above, that “information” regulation will be adopted as a compromise
176

I assume that regulations could specify how the provision would apply to cards issued
by entities that are distinct from the retailer, but under common control with the retailer.
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because of a failure of the political will to adopt direct substantive reforms. I discuss
here a narrow rule that would ban marketing to minors and also more ambitious reforms
generally designed to enhance disclosure at the point of sale.

1.

Special Rules for Minors

The simplest possibility is to establish special rules for minors. If the concern
about credit cards is that consumers use them without fully appreciating the costs and
risks associated with incurring substantial amounts of debt, then we might be particularly
concerned about transactions in which minors are involved. The law in other contexts
often relies on the possible susceptibility of minors to articulate special paternalistic rules
designed to protect minors from their own mistakes. Consider for example rules
invalidating certain contracts made by minors and rules validating spendthrift trusts.178
In this context, some parallels are apparent. Most obviously, Section 50 of Britain’s
Consumer Credit Act flatly prohibits direct marketing of credit cards to persons under the
age of 18.179
There is good reason to think in this country that credit card institutions are
devoting a substantial amount of effort to marketing targeted at minors. For example,
recent news stories discuss initiatives in which major card issuers, with the approval of
university administrators, implement card-issuance programs directly on University
campuses.180 Such programs are most effective. For example, recent surveys suggest
that 78% of college students that have student loans also have credit cards, that about half
of all college students do not pay off their balances each month, and that the average
undergraduate student is carrying $2,748 in credit card debt.181 Even more sobering is a
recent CitiBank product, which offers 3% cash-back to minors based on their purchases –
but only if they do not repay their bills in full each month.182 The parallel to the efforts of
cigarette manufacturers to get a foothold with young customers is eerie.

178

Nor is it unheard of to extend those rules to credit cards. For example, MONT. CODE
ANN. 31-1-115 bars the issuance of a credit card to a minor without first obtaining consent to the
issuance from the minor’s parent or legal guardian. As discussed above, I am reluctant to
recommend reforms that actually prohibit transactions. Accordingly, this section recommends
the lesser reform of barring marketing to minors rather than the greater prohibition of barring the
issuance to minors entirely.
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Fitzgerald 2003.
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Lieber 2003. I proposed in the previous section that such products be prohibited even
when they target adults.

56

Credit Card Policy

57

February 16, 2004 Draft

A simple and direct response to this problem is obvious. Congress readily could
add to the Truth in Lending Act a provision based on Section 50 of the British statute.183
Given the particularities of the American marketing practice, it almost might make sense
to extend the provision to include college students. It is difficult to imagine broadranging opposition to such a provision.

2.

Contemporaneous Disclosures

The discussion in the previous part links the prodigality problem to the ease of
credit card borrowing and to the failure of consumers to appreciate the risks of borrowing
in which they engage. This is not a new problem. Indeed, the core policy of the Truth in
Lending Act is to respond to unwise borrowing. The specific response, of course, is not
by prohibition of the unwise transactions, but instead by the less paternalistic response of
requiring the issuer to provide more information to the cardholder.
The problem with that response generally is that the existing disclosure system is
for the most part a waste of money. It produces complicated paper disclosures of
information that is not comprehensible to the typical consumer and not particularly
useful, such as the total amount of interest that will be paid over time. Consumers are
unlikely even to read those disclosures. More importantly for my purposes, much of the
information is offered at the time that the credit card application is sent and the account is
opened.184 That is not a time at which increased information is likely to be useful.185 As
discussed above, a salient feature of the credit card system is the separation between the
time of the credit card application and the time of the borrowing. TILA does not require
any disclosure of information at the time of the specific borrowing transaction.186 If the
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A more forceful response would be to bar the issuance of cards to minors entirely. As
discussed above, however, I am not inclined to favor proposals that directly bar transactions from
the marketplace.
184

Regulation Z, 12 CFR § 226.5a (describing requirements for applications and
solicitations), 226.6 (describing required initial disclosures).
185

I am more ambivalent about disclosures that might affect the decision to select a
monthly payment amount. Low minimum payments join with the fees discussed in the text as
part of a system that can lead to aggregate outstanding balances far in excess of the original
borrowed amount. I am quite skeptical of the need to impose a larger minimum-payment
requirement by statute, largely because cardholders in distress can obtain benefits from low
minimum payments just as surely as they can abuse them by repaying their balances too slow. I
must admit, however, that a disclosure of information about minimum payments delivered to a
cardholder with a monthly statement does come at the appropriate time if the purpose is to
influence the cardholder to select the payment amount in a responsible way. I am not, however,
persuaded that irresponsibility in the selection of payment amounts is nearly so big a problem as
the prodigality in borrowing in the first instance that I discuss in the text. Accordingly, I am
inclined to think that additional disclosures about the significance of low payment amounts would
be a waste of resources.
186

Compare Regulation E, 12 CFR § 205.9(a) (requiring contemporaneous receipt in
electronic point-of-sale transactions).
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point of borrowing is the point at which borrowers are failing to appreciate the
significance of their actions, then disclosures at the point of borrowing might be more
effective. The existing disclosures for the most part are largely a waste of resources that
would be better expended in other ways.187
The plausibility of this point is underscored by widely noted shifts in the revenue
models of credit card issuers. Two traditional revenue sources – annual fees and interest
revenues – have declined substantially in importance by comparison to fees for such
things as late charges and overlimit transactions. For example, between 1994 and 1998,
interest income rose by about 70% (from $34 billion to $58 billion), while penalty
charges rose by about 125% (from $8 billion to $18 billion) and late fees rose by more
than 300% (from $1.7 billion to $7.3 billion).188 I have not located statistics about the
current revenues from those sources, but it is clear that the amounts of the fees are
increasing. Current industry statistics indicate that the average late fee among large
issuers is now more than $30,189 and the average overlimit fee is now over $29.190
Based on experience in my household (which has paid a significant amount of late
fees over the last few years), it seems quite likely that a substantial amount of those fees
does not reflect financial distress, but an imperfect ability to manage information related
to the credit card. The payment is not late because the money is not there, but because of
an imperfect effort to time the payment to fall on the latest possible day. The transaction
does not go over the limit because of a crisis-driven need to borrow to the hilt, but
because of a lack of information as to exactly how much is outstanding on any particular
card at any particular time. The validity of that point of course is an empirical question.
I do not really know what share of late charges and overlimit fees accrue on accounts that
187

Thus, I find the recent legislation promoting so-called “Schumer boxes” an
aggravation of the existing problem, not an improvement. 15 U.S.C. § 1637(c), 12 CFR §
226.5a(b). England’s pending decision to adopt a similar disclosure requirement is equally
unfortunate. See http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/3293707.stm (Dec. 8, 2003) (discussing the
British government’s recent proposal to require Schumer boxes in British card solicitations).
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Demos 2003:35-36.
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http://www.cardweb.com/carddata/charts/latepayment_fees.amp. The amount has
increased by 45% since 1998 and 176% since 1993. Dec. 5, 2003 CardFlash. Part of the cause of
the increased revenue from late payment fees doubtless is the persistent shortening of grace
periods. The average grace period has fallen from 29.7 days in 1990 to 21.5 days at the end of
2001. http://www.cardweb.com/carddata/charts/grace_periods_endofyear_averages.amp. There
also appears to be an increasingly technical approach that credit card companies use to
determining when payments arrive. See Liz Pulliam Weston, More Games the Credit-Card
Companies
Play,
available
at
http://moneycentral.msn.com/content/Banking/Yourcreditrating/P51865.asp (discussing practices
under which payments are not treated as received on the date that they reach the credit card
issuer’s processing center).
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http://www.cardweb.com/carddata/charts/overlimit_fees.amp. That amount is 42%
larger than the comparable 1998 figure and 141% higher than the comparable 1993 figure. Dec.
5, 2003 CardFlash.
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are not generally in default, but that is my point. If we knew that a substantial amount of
those fees were incurred because of mistakes rather than a “true” need for the funds, it
would be an indictment of the business model that relies on those fees so heavily.
As an informational matter, that problem resonates with much of the discussion in
this article. We in fact know very little empirically about the operation of the card
system in this country. It is an embarrassment that the regulatory authorities in other
countries (Australia and the UK in particular) have so much more accurate historical and
current information about payment systems in their countries than we have in this
country. If these issues present problems of concern to policymakers, a first step that
should encounter little opposition would be for some agency of the government to begin
collecting some minimal amounts of information about the subject. On questions of
particular interest, targeted government data collection seems appropriate. The relation
between late and penalty fees and financial distress seems an obvious candidate.
That discussion suggests that a disclosure system keyed to the point of borrowing
could be more effective than the existing disclosure system keyed to the point at which
the line of credit is authorized. Specifically, I suggest that it would alter the actions of
cardholders in a substantial way if they were advised at the time of each transaction as to
the amount of their credit line, the amount of credit available at the time of the
transaction, and any overlimit or other fees that would be charged to them for engaging in
the transaction in question. In transactions that are authorized “online” with a
contemporaneous electronic communication from the issuer, the relevant information
could be transmitted to the merchant along with the authorization; the merchant’s
payment terminal could display the information to the cardholder before the cardholder
finally approves the transaction. The EFTA already requires a paper receipt in electronic
point-of-sale payments.191 Essentially, this would be similar to the common screen
requiring the cardholder to approve a fee charged by an out-of-system ATM machine
before the transaction proceeds.
As with the proposal related to affinity fees, this proposal would require
considerable delineation before it could be enacted. Thus, it would not be practical for
Congress to articulate the details of the proposal. Among other things, the proposal
would depend on alterations in the method by which terminals process transactions.
Details about such things could be ironed out only after consultation with affected
industry groups – terminal manufacturers, issuers, acquirers, and merchants. Moreover, it
well might be impractical to extend the proposal to the small share of transactions that are
cleared without contemporaneous electronic authorization.192 Those details should be left
to the Federal Reserve for implementation through amendments to Regulation Z. The
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Regulation E, 12 CFR § 205.9(a).
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In countries that clear a smaller share of their transactions electronically (a category
that includes most if not all countries other than the United States), this proposal would impose
much greater costs and thus be much less practical.
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broad outlines discussed above, however, would be suitable for implementation through
amendments to the Truth in Lending Act.

V. CONCLUSION
The major thread of this paper is that credit cards are a global phenomenon, an
aspect of globalization that we all must observe with the same combination of trepidation
and admiration as we do most aspects of globalization. I have suggested a number of
specific statutory reforms – rules permitting merchants to impose surcharges for credit
card use, limiting affinity programs, barring marketing that targets minors, and
revamping the disclosure system. But my broader goal is to further a general
understanding of that phenomenon. I certainly would not suggest that I have solved the
basic problem of the credit card. I do hope, however, that I have provided some food for
thought about it.
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DATA APPENDIX
The purpose of this appendix is to summarize the sources of the data in the
figures. Section 1 starts with some general descriptions of the major sources on which I
relied for the payment card information and then continues with a detailed listing of the
sources for each of the countries. Section 2 discusses sources for the nature of the
bankruptcy discharge in various countries.
Section 1: Payment Card Data
Nilson Report: The Nilson Report is a proprietary periodical that reports detailed
information about all aspects of credit and debit card transactions in the United States and
a variety of information about other countries. Because it is proprietary, it is not clear
exactly how it is collected. It is, however, plainly the best source for the United States, in
the absence of any substantial public statistical source.
BIS Data: The most general source of data is the Bank for International
Settlements’ series Statistics on Payment and Settlement Systems in Selected Countries
and Statistics on Payment Systems in the Group of Ten Countries. The first of those (the
so-called “Red Book”) now includes information on Belgium, Canada, France, Germany,
Hong Kong, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Singapore, Sweden, and Switzerland. The G-10
series includes information on Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Hong Kong, Italy,
Japan, Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
The information typically includes whatever information is available about the
number and value of credit and debit card transactions, as well as matching information
about GDP, population, and exchange rate. The data are obtained from the central banks
of the respective nations. The problem with relying on the data is that they are
inconsistent, in the sense that different publications report different data for the same
year. For example, the 1999, 2000, and 2001 G-10 publications all might report different
numbers for 1998 credit card transactions in Japan. The data also (as with Canada)
commonly include such serious discontinuities in the data as to suggest a shift in data
collection techniques. Because the data come from central banks, I do not think I should
dismiss them as unreliable. I do not, however, use them whenever I have better data
sources available.
Euromonitor: Euromonitor publishes an extensive set of information about a large
number of countries. Ultimately, however, I decided that the data has too many errors to
make it reliable. The difficulty is that in the few countries where I am confident that I
have reliable information directly from central banks (Canada and the UK, for example),
the Euromonitor data is widely off (much lower than the central bank data).
Australia: Australia has the best collection of information in the world.
Substantially all of the relevant information is on the Royal Bank’s Web site at
www.rba.gov.au. From that site I collected information on the number and value of
credit and debit card transactions, as well as information about credit card debt. I
collected information on population, GDP, and exchange rates from the World Bank’s
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WDI database. Because they were not available at WDI, I collected 2002 information on
population from www.abs.gov.au/ausstats, GDP from www.rba.gov.au, and exchange
rate from www.xe.com.
Belgium: The National Bank of Belgium provided information on the number
and amount of credit card and debit card transactions. I collected information on
population and GDP from the World Bank’s WDI database.
Canada: I have collected data on Canada from a variety of sources. Data on the
number of credit card and debit card transactions has been compiled from the Nilson
Report, a proprietary periodical, supplemented with data from Interac (Canada’s local
debit-card system), www.interac.org. For information on credit card debt, and on ratios
of credit card debt to credit card volume, I have accepted the advice of the Bank of
Canada and rely on data about Visa and MasterCard transactions, which the Bank has
provided to me. Data on fraud are from epaynews.com. I collected information on
population, GDP, and exchange rate from the World Bank’s WDI database. Because
2002 information was not in WDI, I collected 2002 population from CIA World Factbook
(www.cia.gov) and the 2002 exchange rate from www.x-rates.com.
China: I collected information on the value and number of credit and debit card
transactions, population, GDP, and exchange rates from Payment Systems in EMEAP
Countries, published in July 2002 by the Working Group on Payment and Settlement
Systems of the Executives’ Meeting of East Asia-Pacific Central Banks and Monetary
Authorities (EMEAP). This publication is modeled on the BIS publications, but includes
information on a number of East Asian countries.
France: Data on France is hard to acquire, because the system is dominated by
the Cartes Bancaires card, offered by a consortium of banks. It is easy to obtain statistics
about that system, but not about the card products offered outside that system. I used
Cartes Bancaires data for the figure on total card transactions. I collected information on
population from the World Bank’s WDI database.
Italy: I collected data on the value and amount of credit and debit card
transactions, population, GDP, and exchange rates from the BIS publications.
Japan: I collected data on credit and debit card transactions from the BIS
publications. Data on fraud are from the Japan Consumer Credit Industry Association’s
annual yearbook. I collected information on population and GDP from the World Bank’s
WDI database.
Netherlands: I collected data on population, GDP, and the number and amount of
credit and debit card transactions from the BIS publications.
New Zealand: I collected information on credit card debt and volume from the
central bank’s Web site at www.rbnz.govt.nz.
South Korea: For information on credit card debt and credit card volume, I rely
on information published in Cards International, supplemented with related unpublished
IX
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data collected by Anthony O’Brien. I collected information on GDP from the World
Bank’s WDI database. I collected information on exchange rates from www.x-rates.com
(because it was not available in the WDI database).
Sweden: I collected information on the value and amount of debit and credit card
transactions, population, GDP, and exchange rates from the BIS publications.
UK: The most general source of information is APACS (the Association for
Payment Clearing Services), www.apacs.org.uk. I have relied on APACS’s Plastic Card
Review 2002 for information about the number and amount of credit and debit card
transactions.
Data on fraud are from Cardwatch (an arm of APACS),
www.cardwatch.org.uk. For credit card debt, I rely on information provided to me by the
Bank of England. I collected information on population, GDP, and exchange rates from
the World Bank’s WDI database.
USA: There is no general governmental source for information about credit-card
and debit-card transactions in the United States. The most widely used source is the
Nilson Report. I have compiled from various issues of that periodical data about the
number and amount of credit and debit card transactions and about credit card debt. Data
on fraud are from epaynews.com. I collected information on population and GDP from
the World Bank’s WDI database. The information in Figure 11 about noncash consumer
payment systems also is from the Nilson Report.
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Section 2: Bankruptcy Discharges
There obviously is a considerable degree of subjectivity in assigning countries to the
specific categories. I am heartened, however, by the consensus between the two major
scholars that have thought about this question (Ziegel and Efrat) as to the underlying
significance of the distinctions. See, e.g., Ziegel (2003):147-49.
Mandatory Discharges:
Australia: Bankruptcy Act, 1966, § 149 (Austl.). For secondary discussion, see LEWIS’
AUSTRALIAN BANKRUPTCY LAW 240-44 (11th ed. 1999 D. Rose).
Canada: Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, 1985, § 170. For secondary discussion, see
JACOB S. ZIEGEL, COMPARATIVE CONSUMER INSOLVENCY REGIMES—A CANADIAN
PERSPECTIVE 38-39 (2003)
Netherlands: PETER J.M. CECLERQ, NETHERLANDS INSOLVENCY LAW: THE NETHERLANDS
BANKRUPTCY ACT AND THE MOST IMPORTANT LEGAL CONCEPTS 3 (2002)
New Zealand: Insolvency Act 1967, § 107(1). For secondary discussion, see Paul Heath,
Consumer Bankruptcies: A New Zealand Perspective, 37 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 427, 436
(1999).
UK: Insolvency Act 1986, § 279(1). For secondary discussion, see THE INSOLVENCY
SERVICE, DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY, BANKRUPTCY: A FRESH START (2000)
16; Michael Adler, The Overseas Dimension: What Can Canada and the United States
Learn from the United Kingdom, 37 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 415, 416 (1999)
USA: 11 U.S.C. § 727.
Discretionary Discharges:
Japan: Bankruptcy Act art. 366.
South Africa: Insolvencies Act § 129(1)(b). For secondary discussion, see HOCKLEY’S
INSOLVENCY LAW 147-48 (6th ed. 1996 R. Sharrock et al.)
Sweden: Johanna Niemi-Kiesiläinen, Consumer Bankruptcy in Comparison: Do We Cure
a Market Failure or a Social Problem, 37 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 473, 495-96 (1999)
No Discharge:
Belgium: Bernard Hanotiau, Concordat and Bankruptcy in Belgium, 2002 ANN. SURV. OF
BANKR. LAW 367. This information also was confirmed in correspondence with the
National Bank of Belgium.
Italy: IAN F. FLETCHER, THE LAW OF INSOLVENCY 7 (1st ed. 1990)
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STATISTICAL APPENDIX

A. The Relative Significance of Economic Development and Globalization
For this analysis, consumer credit/GDP was the dependent variable. I used two
independent variables. The first was GDP/capita, as an index of economic development.
The second was a globalization index constructed by Foreign Policy magazine. {A 1 is
the best score (for most globalized); higher numbers reflect less globalization.}
The data is set out in the following table.
COUNTRY GDP/POP* CONC/GDP** GLOB. INDEX
USA
33.5
16.4
11
Canada
22.2
17.9
7
UK
24.1
15.9
9
Germany
23.2
7.0
17
France
21.8
12.0
12
Italy
18.1
3.9
24
Spain
10.8
3.5
18
Netherlands
21.7
10.4
5
Belgium
22.9
4.8
n/a
Argentina
7.7
3.3
48
Mexico
5.9
0.5
49
Brazil
3.6
4.7
57
Australia
16.8
11.6
21
India
0.5
2.1
56
Japan
36.0
14.4
35
Hong Kong
23.6
9.1
n/a
Taiwan
14.3
8.0
34
South Korea
9.0
11.7
28
Singapore
23.3
15.1
4
*Thousands of United States dollars.
** Consumer Credit/Gross Domestic Product (Percentage).
Source: 2000 data. GDP and Consumer Credit from Morgan Stanley. Population
from World Bank.
Summary results follow.
R
R2 Adj. R2 Stand. Error
.819 .670
.623
3.3366
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Model
Sum Of Square df Mean Square
F
Sig.
Regression
316.918
2
158.459
14.233 .000
Residual
155.862
14
11.133
Total
472.780
16

Unstandardized Unstandardized Standardized
T
Sig.
B
Stand. Error
Beta
(Constant)
6.511
3.466
1.879 .041
Globalization Index
-.098
.065
-.326
-1.520 .76
GDP/POP
.303
.116
.558
2.602 .011
Model

The globalization index was not statistically significant at any level. GDP/POP was
significant at the 5% level (one-tailed). GDP/POP and the globalization index together
explain 62% of the variance on consumer credit/GDP.
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B. Crime and Credit Card Spending
The following tables report results comparing credit-card spending to the total
number of reported crimes.
Obs.
30
F (1, 4)
0.38
Prob > F 0.5704
R2
0.0296
Root MSE 926.82

Robust
95% Conf.
t
P > │t│
Std. Err.
Interval
TOTCRIME .0544117 .0881258 0.62 0.570 -.1902648 .2990883
Cons
1697.515 854.0428 1.99 0.118 -673.6882 4068.718
CCSPEND

Coef.

The following tables report results comparing credit-card spending to murders.
Obs.
30
F (1, 4)
10.30
Prob > F 0.0326
R2
0.3626
Root MSE 751.12

Robust
95% Conf.
t
P > │t│
Std. Err.
Interval
MURDERS 274.7776 85.63776 3.21 0.033 37.0904
512.5461
Cons
1075.766 307.6455 3.50 0.025 221.6055 1929.927
CCSPEND

Coef.

Although that initial analysis suggested a significant relationship, further
examination indicated the relationship was spurious. Models by country showed a
significant negative relationship for both US and Canada, but for the remaining countries
a positive though statistically insignificant relationship. Removing the U.S. and Canada
from analysis and fitting a model on the remaining pooled country data failed to change
the overall positive relationship. We can probably conclude that this relation is not
causal insofar as higher spending is associated with higher murder rates. Murder rates
decline over time for the U.S., U.K., and Canada with other countries showing no trend
over time. At the same time consumer spending shows a marked increase over time for
all countries. Therefore, those three countries might be driving the association.
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A further assessment checks on how changes in spending respond to changes in
murder rate. The model is
DY = DX + e
where DY = Yt-Y(t-1) and DX = X(t-2)-X(t-1), where Y is spending and X is murder rate and t is year.
Note that change in murder rate is lagged by one year. There is no evidence that change in
spending is responsive to change in murder rates.

Robust
95% Conf.
t
P > │t│
Std. Err.
Interval
∆CRIME -29.37247 41.10587 -0.71 0.514 -143.5006 84.75571
Cons
175.0893 43.11618 4.06
0.015 55.37961
294.799
∆SPEND

Coef.
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C. Credit Card Debt and Savings
The data was analyzed by an OLS regression with robust standard errors. The
first formulation used the ratio of credit-card spending to gross domestic product as the
independent variable. The dependent variable is savings. A summary of the results
follows.
Obs.
43
F (1, 3)
3.22
Prob > F 0.1707
R2
0.0780
Root MSE 2.9306

Robust
95% Conf.
t
P > │t│
Std. Err.
Interval
CCSPEND -.0009197 .0005126 -1.79
0.171 .0025511 .0007116
Cons
21.03085 1.593569 13.20 0.001 15.9594
26.1023
SAVE

Coef.

An alternate formulation used the ratio of credit-card debt to gross domestic
product as the independent variable. It was similarly inconclusive.
Obs.
45
F (1, 3)
3.43
Prob > F 0.1612
R2
0.1099
Root MSE 2.916

Robust
95% Conf.
T
P > │t│
Std. Err.
Interval
CCGDP -.554191 .2993293 -1.85 0.161 -1.506791 .3984084
Cons
20.81035 2.093589 9.94 0.002 14.14762
27.47308
SAVE

Coef.
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D. Credit Card Debt, Consumer Credit & Bankruptcy
On this topic, I used a multivariate analysis of consumer bankruptcies as a function of
credit card spending, credit card debt, and consumer credit. I used the four countries for which I
was able to obtain a time series of data on all four of those data points: Australia, Canada, USA,
UK. The consumer bankruptcy variable was lagged by one year in the analysis.
PROBLEMS
The goal was to determine the separate effects of the independent variables on
bankruptcies. Because of the high correlation among the independent variables, it is not easy to
draw inferences about their effects. That high correlation can lead to conditions of near linear
dependence or multicollinearity in a multivariate analysis. Another potential problem is that the
data points are not independent due to the repeated measures (I have a cross-sectional time
series), which can lead to autocorrelation in the outcome variable and in the error terms. Both the
multicollinearity and autocorrelation problems can lead to invalid inferences from standard linear
(OLS) regressions.
Accounting for Multicollinearity
I use a variance inflation factor (vif) to evaluate the seriousness of the multicollinearity
problem. Analysis of the data on a country-by-country basis produced unacceptably high
measures of vif (more than 30). See CHATTERJEE AND PRICE (1991). When the data were pooled
across countries, however, the vif fell to 10, which satisfies a more conservative standard of
multicollinearity. Concerns about multicollinearity also are less serious when covariate effects
are statistically significant. As discussed below, the covariate variables have statistically
significant effects, even after adjusting for the presence of autocorrelation. Accordingly, I
ultimately concluded that multicollinearity is not a serious problem.
Accounting for Autocorrelation
Because autocorrelation is a form of heteroscedasticity – observations may have different
error variances instead of the constant variance assumed by OLS estimates – it affects the
standard errors of the model estimates. What that means is that the standard estimates are
unbiased, but the standard errors are generally smaller. That raises the risk of rejecting a null
hypothesis that is in fact true. To approach this problem, I estimate the model using the robust
(heteroscedastic-consistent) variance estimator of Huber and White based on groupwise
heteroscedasticity. The groups in this case are the four countries for which I have repeated
measures. Thus, the procedure to obtain variances of estimates explicitly accounts for the lack of
independent observations within groups. Because this analysis produces larger standard errors
than OLS would report, I obtain more conservative significance tests on the parameters of
interest, and reduce the chance of falsely rejecting a true null hypothesis.
RESULTS

Source
SS
df
MS
Model
8030773.3 3 26776294.4
Residual 16354959.3 40 408873.982
Total
96685732.5 43 2248505.41
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F (3, 40)
Prob > F
R2
Adj. R2
Root MSE
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44
65.49
0.0000
0.8308
0.8182
639.43

Robust
T
Beta
Std. Err.
CCDebt 1.437692
.6579
2.19 .6583197
ConCR 1.494524
.4708
3.17 1.167568
CCSpend -1.478452 .9583 -1.54 -.9567691
CONST -2348.675 622.63 -3.77
SAVE

Coef.

Credit card spending (CCSpend) is not significant, while credit card debt
(CCDebt) and overall consumer credit (ConCR) are. The model explains more than 80%
of the variation in bankruptcy rates.
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E. Credit Card Spending and Consumer Bankruptcy Discharges
GROUP STATISTICS
Discharge
N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean
No
2
2.6
.14142
.10000
Yes
6 10.0000
4.51088
1.84156
Discretionary 3 4.4667
1.10604
.63857

INDEPENDENT SAMPLES TEST
Yes versus Discretionary
Equal
Variances

F*

Sig.*

T

df

Sig.

Mean
Dif.

Assumed
Not Assumed

1.5962
n/a

.247
n/a

2.028
2.839

7
6.056

.041
.015

5.5333
5.5333

Std. Error
Diff.
2.72799
1.94913

Interval of the
Difference
-.9173311 .98399
.77462
10.29205

No versus Yes
Equal
Variances
Assumed
Not Assumed

F*

Sig.*

T

df

Sig.

Mean
Dif.

1.748
n/a

.234
n/a

-2.201
-4.012

6
5.029

.035
.005

-7.4000
-7.4000

Std. Error
Diff.
3.36254
1.84427

Interval of the
Difference
-15.62784 .82784
-12.13255 -2.66745

No versus Discretionary
Equal
Variances
Assumed
Not Assumed

F*

Sig.*

T

df

Sig.

Mean
Dif.

2.617
n/a

.204
n/a

-2.255
-2.888

3
2.097

.055
.048

-1.8667
-1.8667

Std. Error
Diff.
.82776
.64636

Interval of the
Difference
-4.50097
-4.52827

.76763
.79493

* Calculated using Levene’s test for equality of variances
As the results indicate, the mean of credit card spending is significantly different (at the
5% level) for every category comparison except for No vs. Discretionary, which is quite
close (.055) and well might meet the 5% level if the sample size were increased.
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